25 Jun, 14 | by Iain Brassington
No surprises at the result, but the ruling itself looks like it might make for interesting reading. Analysis to follow…
25 Jun, 14 | by Iain Brassington
No surprises at the result, but the ruling itself looks like it might make for interesting reading. Analysis to follow…
1 Jun, 14 | by Iain Brassington
There’s a nice little piece by Martin Robbins in this week’s Guardian in which he talks about the fact that women seem to be less supportive of abortion than men. That does seem counterintuitive, given that… well, given the obvious physiological facts and the relative burden of risks related to pregnancy. So there’s an interesting little anthropological puzzle here; and he suggests a number of factors that might explain the phenomenon. For example, there’s some research that finds that women are more likely than men to agree that life begins at conception – though, as he points out, while that might help explain the different views of termination, we’d still need to know why more women think that to begin with. Another potential explanation is that men like the idea of not having to do the right thing by their pregnant partners by paying child-support or, if you’re reading this in the 1950s, marrying them: abortion gives a way out of that. But – and Robbins doesn’t mention this – that again presupposes keeping the baby as the default position to which people are looking for an alternative. We could also talk about social pressure, and the way that women are still expected to be mothers, and how that feeds into attitudes. In fact, we could talk about a lot of things:
So which is it? Internalised sexism, men’s liberation, fundamentally different ideas about the point at which life begins, or something else entirely? I doubt only one factor is at work, but it seems that we lack a definitive answer. And that’s a shame, because in the ongoing battle of ideas it seems like a very important question to ask.
I suspect some will deride his “we need to do more research” conclusion, but it seems eminently sensible to say that, faced with a quirk of attitudes, a full explanation would be at least aesthetically satisfying, even if not especially urgent. He also provides lots of useful links.
16 May, 14 | by Iain Brassington
So: what is one to make of Conchita Wurst? I’ve not heard the song that won Eurovision this year, but I’m willing to bet that the world would be a better place if every entrant had been thrown into the Køge Bay before a single note was struck. But that might just be me.
Writing in the Telegraph, Brendan O’Neill has other concerns. Why, oh why, oh why can’t people just use the pronoun “he” when referring to Wurst? Wurst was born a man; therefore the male pronoun is more appropriate. (He’s never one to duck the important issues of the day, is Bren.) “Did everyone overnight transmogrify into a Gender Studies student and imbibe the unhinged idea that gender is nothing more than a ‘playful’ identity?” he asks. More: the fact that people refer to Wurst with the feminine pronoun is a symptom of what he calls “today’s speedily spreading cult of relativism”, and allowing people to choose their identity is “narcissistic”.
Now, let’s just ignore for the moment that Conchita Wurst is a character, and so it makes perfect sense to call her “her” in just the same way that one might use “her” to refer to Dame Edna Everage. (Thanks to someone I don’t know on Facebook for making that analogy – it’s a good ‘un.) O’Neill sort-of-acknowledges that, but he doesn’t let that minor point get in the way of a more general rant against people preferring to be referred to by one pronoun rather than another. For example, he takes this swipe at Chelsea Manning:
1 Apr, 14 | by Iain Brassington
… there’s this, from last week’s Independent:
Thousands of unborn foetuses incinerated to heat UK hospitals
The bodies of more than 15,000 unborn foetuses have been incinerated in the UK, an investigation has found, with some treated as “clinical waste” and others burned to heat hospitals.
The practice was carried out by 27 NHS trusts, with at least 15,500 bodies burned over the last two years alone.
Ten of those trusts admitted to burning more than 1,000 sets of remains along with other hospital rubbish, while two said they were incinerated in “waste-to-energy” furnaces that generate energy used to power and heat hospitals.
Gasp! One kind of human tissue is disposed of in the same way as other kinds of human tissue!
From the tone of the reporting, one would only be mildly surprised to find people employed to encourage abortions in order that hospitals can save money on fuel.
Except that that’s nonsense. If clinical waste is incinerated in waste-to-heat plants, it doesn’t follow that it’s being incinerated to provide heating; rather, it’s that the heat from the incinerator is captured and put to use, rather than being wasted. For sure, the physics is the same; but the emphasis makes a heck of a difference. (And, as PZ points out, for abortus* to be an effective fuel would require them to be “the most energy-dense substance in the world”.) So what we actually have is a situation in which an abortus is incinerated.
And the problem with that is…?
Well, I’m sure there must be one, because health minister Dan Poulter is reported as describing the practice as “totally unacceptable”, and Poulter is an honourable man.
Actually, there is a few things that might strike us as questionable – though as we’ll see, the fact that something prompts a question doesn’t really tell us much, since some questions can be answered easily. more…
30 Mar, 14 | by Iain Brassington
It’s funny how things come together sometimes. A few months ago, I mentioned a slightly strange JAMA paper that suggested that non-compliance with treatment regimes should be treated as a treatable condition in its own right. The subtext there was fairly clear: that there’s potential scope for what we might term “psychiatric mission-creep”, whereby behaviour gets seen as pathological just if it’s undesirable and can be changed with drugs. I was reminded of this by a couple of things I found last weekend.
I was avoiding work by pootling away on the internet, and stumbled across a couple of things. This – an article about American politics that notes the use of psychiatry as a means of social control – was one of them:
[In 1980] an increasingly authoritarian American Psychiatric Association added to their diagnostic bible (then the DSM-III) disruptive mental disorders for children and teenagers such as the increasingly popular “oppositional defiant disorder” (ODD). The official symptoms of ODD include “often actively defies or refuses to comply with adult requests or rules,” “often argues with adults,” and “often deliberately does things to annoy other people.”
Many of America’s greatest activists including Saul Alinsky […] would today certainly be diagnosed with ODD and other disruptive disorders. Recalling his childhood, Alinsky said, “I never thought of walking on the grass until I saw a sign saying ‘Keep off the grass.’ Then I would stomp all over it.” Heavily tranquilizing antipsychotic drugs (e.g. Zyprexa and Risperdal) are now the highest grossing class of medication in the United States ($16 billion in 2010); a major reason for this, according to the Journal of the American Medical Association in 2010, is that many children receiving antipsychotic drugs have nonpsychotic diagnoses such as ODD or some other disruptive disorder (this especially true of Medicaid-covered pediatric patients).
For some reason, I had foxes on my mind as well, and so I entered the word “Fox” into google; and I should have known that it’d provide lots of hits for the US TV conglomerate. One story that came up on the search had to do with a twitter account called @LIPartyStories. This was apparently a feed that would repost pictures sent from its teenage followers of themselves in various states of intoxication and déshabillé. So far, so straightforward: the day that teenagers stop getting drunk and doing stupid things at parties is the day that the world will stop turning. Granted, when I was young, we didn’t post stuff online – but if the internet had been around, we probably would have. Kids do daft stuff; they sometimes regret it; then they grow up, and do daft stuff less.
15 Feb, 14 | by Iain Brassington
With any luck, the nuts real-world work schedule of the past few months* will begin to ease in a few days, so I should be able to start blogging more frequently soon; but I thought I’d take a moment out from writing jurisprudence lectures to do some thinking out loud about Belgium’s recent change to its euthanasia law, which legalises it for children. This is partly because it’s interesting in its own right, and partly because I’m debating it on Radio 4’s Sunday programme this week. I’ve drafted this post before the interview’s recorded, but I’m not publishing it until after (though before the broadcast); let’s see how my thoughts here pan out on air…**
For reference, the text of the law is available here in French, and here in Dutch – thank goodness for A/S levels. A decent précis provided by AP is hosted here; and Christian Munthe has an unofficial translation here.
OK: so, what should we think about it? more…
21 Jan, 14 | by Iain Brassington
Reader Keith emailed me a week or so ago to tip me off about the government’s plans to allow private firms to access medical information. It’s a story that has subsequently been picked up by – inter alia – The Guardian.
As with the last post I made here, I’m going to have to cry off from saying much in my own right – I’ve got lectures that need to be written, and I need at least to go through the motions of being competent – but I would draw your attention the Christian Munthe’s take on the matter.
Touch wood, I’ll be able to get back to more frequent blogging soon.
17 Jan, 14 | by Iain Brassington
This is just a quick post, and it’s mainly to draw your attention to a couple of other posts worth reading elsewhere.
A little background: there’s been a minor fuss* in the media over the last few days concerning sex-specific abortion**, after The Independent reported that
[t]he practice of sex-selective abortion is now so commonplace that it has affected the natural 50:50 balance of boys to girls within some immigrant groups and has led to the “disappearance” of between 1,400 and 4,700 females from the national census records of England and Wales, we can reveal.
Now, there’s something a bit fishy about the article even on its own terms: alarm bells should be got ringing by this:
[O]ur deeper statistical analysis of data from the 2011 National Census has shown widespread discrepancies in the sex ratio of children in some immigrant families, which can only be easily explained by women choosing to abort female foetuses in the hope of becoming quickly pregnant again with a boy.
After all, it does seem to reduce to a claim along the lines that “I can’t think of a better explanation than e for phenomenon p, therefore e obtains” – but that tells us far more about the limits of the speaker’s imagination than about the state of the world. Besides, while there are good reasons to favour the most simple explanation of p, one ought to keep a distinction between the simple and the simplistic. Bluntly, an easy explanation isn’t any more likely to be true by dint of being easy. E=mc2 is simple once you’ve derived it, but its derivation isn’t easy.
They’re very worth the read – but I recommend that you make yourself a good cup of tea before starting them. They’re looooooong. I’d be interested to know what others think, though.
UPDATE: There’s even more. I think Unity’s enjoying himself with this.
* Minor in the sense that it’s been eclipsed by things like Oscar nominations.
** Here’s Christina Odone, for example, blaming it all on feminism. Surprised? You could knock me down with a bulldozer.
11 Jan, 14 | by Iain Brassington
It’s good to see that Stephen Latham is blogging again after a short hiatus; and he’s come back with a really thought-provoking post on IVF and problems of identity.
The background is this: apparently, there is evidence that children conceived by IVF are at an elevated risk of health problems compared to kids conceived naturally:
Compared to spontaneously-conceived singletons, singletons from assisted conception were almost twice as likely to be stillborn, more than twice as likely to be pre-term, almost three times as likely to have very low birth weight, and twice as likely to die within the first four weeks after birth. Outcomes varied by type of assisted conception. Very low and low birth weight, very preterm and preterm birth, and neonatal death were “markedly” more common in births from IVF and, to a lesser degree, in births from ICSI. Use of frozen embryos elminated the risks of ICSI, but not of IVF. But frozen embryos also had increased risk of macrosomia.
This is the paper that Stephen mentions; but it’s not the only one to report potential risks associated with IVF. A rather kneejerk response to this is to go “Eeeep! This means that IVF is dangerous, and we’re harming kids by conceiving them by this method”. (I suspect that there’s an element of that in posts like this – though admittedly if that element is there, it’s being deployed merely as a part of a wider attack on IVF, motivated for different reasons.) But, of course, kneejerk reactions are rarely all that morally insightful, and the conventional response to concerns about IVF is rather more sanguine.
Borrowing heavily from Parfit, the standard response is this: each of us is reliant on a particular egg and a particular sperm having fused in a particular way. Had that been different, we would not have come into being. A month later, and it’d’ve been a different egg; and it could easily have been a different sperm cell. Any resultant child would be related to us only in the same way as a sibling – except that it wouldn’t be our sibling, because we wouldn’t be there. This indicates that, if IVF represents a child’s only chance of coming into existence – and it probably is – it is hard to say that the child has been harmed or wronged thereby. There may be a qualification to add, along the lines that should the child’s life be so bad that non-existence would be preferable, existence may be a harm; but that kind of outcome is probably hyperbolic in practice. An elevated risk of any congenital characteristic is therefore unlikely to count as a harm.
So, as Stephen points out, we can ask a question: more…
30 Dec, 13 | by Iain Brassington
It having been a long time since my last post, and this being the season of good-will, I wasn’t going to comment on the government’s new policy of charging migrants for A&E services. Noone needs that kind of spleen on a dreich Monday; besides: I’ve got a PhD thesis that needs assessing, and a bathroom floor that I’ve been meaning to re-lay all year – all manner of better uses of my time.
Still, there’s a couple of things that merit comment. First, there’s this, from the Government’s press-release:
We know that some people are abusing the system by coming into the country early enough to have one or more antenatal appointments before giving birth on the NHS – without the intention to pay.
I love a good vague statistic. “Some” people. There’s nothing offered about how many that amounts to. Presumably, it’s more than one, but fewer than everyone. Beyond that, though… well… The phrase “some” just isn’t very useful when it comes to making judgements about anything – as waitresses (and diners) can attest. But still, I’m willing to concede that “some” indicates a positive integer, and that there is therefore some measurable impact on expenditure arising from such people. This doesn’t tell us whether it’s expenditure at a level that should bother us. The DoH press release offers some illumination on this point: more…
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