24 Apr, 15 | by Iain Brassington
For my money, one of the best papers at the nonhuman animal ethics conference at Birmingham a couple of weeks ago was Steve Cooke’s.* He was looking at the justifications for direct action in the name of disrupting research on animals, and presented the case – reasonably convincingly – that the main arguments against the permissibility of such direct action simply don’t work. For him, there’s a decent analogy between rescuing animals from laboratories and rescuing drowning children from ponds: in both cases, if you can do so, you should, subject to the normal constraints about reasonable costs. The question then becomes one of what is a reasonable cost. He added to this that the mere illegality of such disruption mightn’t tip the balance away from action. After all, if a law is unjust (he claims), it’s hard to see how that alone would make an all-else-being-equal permissible action impermissible. What the law allows to be done to animals in labs is unjust, and so it doesn’t make much sense to say that breaking the law per se is wrong.
Now, I’m paraphrasing the argument, and ignoring a lot of background jurisprudential debate about obligations to follow the law. (There are those who think that there’s a prima facie obligation to obey the law qua law; but I think that any reasonable version of that account will have a cutoff somewhere should the law be sufficiently unjust.) But for my purposes, I don’t think that that matters.
It’s also worth noting that, at least formally, Cooke’s argument might be able to accommodate at least some animal research. If you can claim that a given piece of research is, all things considered, justifiable, then direct action to disrupt it might not have the same moral backing. Cooke thinks that little, if any, animal research is justified – but, again, that’s another, higher-order, argument.
One consideration in that further argument may be whether you think that there’s a duty to carry out (at least certain kinds of) research. more…