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Research Ethics

How to Keep HIV Cure-Related Trials Ethical: The Benefit/Risk Ratio Challenge

20 Feb, 17 | by bearp

Guest Post by Nir Eyal

Re: Special Issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics on the ethics and challenges of an HIV cure

For most patients with HIV who have access to antiretroviral treatment and use it properly, that treatment works well. But the holy grail of HIV research remains finding a cure. Sometimes that means a literal, sterilizing cure that would remove HIV from the body. But increasingly the aim is to find a mere functional cure that would send HIV into sustained remission during which antiretrovirals would be unnecessary.

Early successes in cure-related research, most notably the apparent cure of ‘Berlin patient’ Timothy Brown, prompted the International AIDS Society and the US National Institutes of Health to declare cure-related research a high priority. Recent successes in animal models have re-kindled hopes, and cure-related research is ongoing.

But there is a catch. Many of the early-phase cure-related studies that are currently planned or under way carry risks that are either very high or hard to quantify. These risks come from toxicity (e.g., of stem cell transplantation in an immunocompromised population), necessary interruptions to antiretroviral treatment (either short ‘pauses’ or intentionally longer breaks), or invasive physical exams. They affect study subjects and, sometimes, third parties like sexual partners or foetuses.

While high or unknown risks are a mainstay of early-phase trials in areas like cancer research, cure study participants typically have a safe and efficacious alternative to those risks: remaining on antiretrovirals. Can we justify asking patients who are doing well on antiretrovirals to accept the risk and uncertainty of many HIV cure-related trials? If we cannot, we might need to give up on the hope of curing HIV, or of achieving controlled remission.

These ethical questions about HIV cure-related trials were first raised by an activist, then asked again and again. They also arise in human subject research beyond HIV cure-related studies: what should we do when it is hard to keep a socially-important study beneficial in prospect to study participants? Are we ever permitted to compromise the individual’s objective interests in the pursuit of collective goals? What are legitimate ways of pre-empting this dilemma? The entire February 2017 issue of Journal of Medical Ethics is dedicated to clarifying and trying to answer these questions.

After an introduction, the journal issue provides a background by leading HIV-cure related researchers Dan Kuritzkes and Kenneth Freedberg and Paul Sax, as well as myself, a philosopher. Articles by legally-trained bioethicists Rebecca Dresser and Seema Shah and philosopher Caspar Hare suggest ways to quantify and mitigate risks to participants of cure-related studies. Contributions by philosopher Lara Buchak, bioethicist and lawyer Emily Largent, and AIDS activist David Evans assess how much the potential benefits to study participants, ranging from the remote hope of being cured through financial incentives to the satisfaction of having helped others, can legitimately offset any remaining risks. Legally-trained bioethicist George Annas and philosopher Danielle Bromwich explore how much participants’ fully informed consent can count as ample protection in cure-related studies, and when that consent counts as full. Philosophers Dan Wikler, Nick Evans (with first author public health expert Regina Brown), Rahul Kumar, and Frances Kamm assess when, if ever, the potential public health benefits of research—e.g., finding a cure for HIV—can warrant placing individual study participants at high net risk. An afterword asks how these investigations should affect future directions in research ethics.

Many contributions agree that myriad ways exist to justify studies that, at least on the face of it, run counter to the best medical interests of candidate participants. Furthermore, one need not be a utilitarian to argue as much. Even so-called contractualist ethicists such as Rahul Kumar can justify such studies, provocative though they may be for current culture in clinical study oversight. That culture, these articles suggest, is hard to defend from a wide spectrum of ethical theories.

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NOTE: This post will be cross-published at BMJ Opinion.

HIV Cure Research and The Dual Aims of the Informed Consent Process

25 Jan, 17 | by miriamwood

Guest Post: Danielle Bromwich and Joseph Millum

Paper: Informed Consent to HIV Research 

Special Issue: The benefit/risk ratio challenge in clinical research, and the case of HIV cure

A cure for HIV would be tremendously valuable. Approximately 37 million people worldwide are HIV-positive and 15 million are currently on antiretroviral therapy. Until recently it was assumed that this therapy would be the extent of HIV treatment and that those with access to it would need to take their drugs for life. But what once seemed impossible is now in early phase clinical trials: interventions designed to completely eradicate HIV from the immune system.

Excitement surrounding these “HIV cure” studies is tempered by ethical concern. They require participants to come off their antiretroviral therapy and undergo highly risky interventions using gene transfers or stem cell therapy. These are currently proof of concept studies—no one expects the participants to be cured. Their purpose is to provide essential information about safety and pharmacokinetics, but in doing so they expose participants to high risks with little prospect of direct benefit.

If we could be confident that participants understood their trials’ true risk-benefit ratio, these high risks might be less troubling. But such confidence would be misplaced. Decades of data show poor comprehension of risk among participants in clinical trials. The fact that HIV is still a stigmatized condition amplifies this concern. Potential participants may be desperate to be rid of their disease and so downplay the risks and exaggerate the potential benefits. Understandably, HIV cure researchers and research ethics committees are worried. What should they do with a patient-participant who wants to come off his medication and receive a high-risk experimental intervention because he thinks that he’ll be “the one” who is cured?

Informed consent is generally thought to be one key protection for participants enrolled in risky studies. The standard view of informed consent says that valid consent requires the person giving consent to understand the risks and benefits of study participation. According to this view, someone who seriously misunderstands the study’s true risk-benefit ratio can be excluded on the grounds that he has not given valid consent to study participation.

In a recent paper, part of a special collection on HIV cure research in the Journal of Medical Ethics, we analyze a range of concerns about informed consent for HIV cure trials.

more…

A Hot Take on a Cold Body

21 Nov, 16 | by Iain Brassington

It’s good to see Nils’ post about the recent UK cryonics ruling getting shared around quite a bit – so it should.  I thought I’d throw in my own voice, too.

About 18 months ago, Imogen Jones and I wrote a paper musing on some of the ethical and legal dimensions of Christopher Priest’s The Prestige.  One dimension of this was a look at the legal status of the bodies produced as a result of the “magic” trick – in particular, the haziness of whether they were alive or dead; the law doesn’t have any space for a third state.  The paper was something of a jeu d’esprit, written to serve a particular function in a Festschrift for Margot Brazier.  If I say so myself, I think it’s a pretty good paper – but it’s also meant to be fun, and is clearly rather less serious than most ethico-legal scholarship (or anything else in the book, for that matter).

coldlazarus5

Not quite “Cold Lazarus”, but close enough…

So it’s a bit of a surprise to see relevantly similar themes popping up in the news.  If we’re freezing people in the hope of curing terminal illness in the future, what’s the status of the bodies in the meantime (especially if the death certificate has been signed)?  There’s a load of questions that we might want to ask before we get too carried away with embracing cryonics.

Right from the start, there’s a question about plausibility.  For the sake of what follows, I’m going to treat “freezing” as including the process of defrosting people successfully as well, unless the context makes it clear that I mean something else.  Now, that said, the (moral) reasons to freeze people rely on the plausibility of the technology.  If the technology is not plausible, we have no reason to make use of it.  It wouldn’t follow from that that using it’d be wrong – but since the default is not to act in that way, it’s positive reasons that we need, rather than negative ones.  Neither could we really rely on the thought that we could cryopreserve someone in the hope that the freezing-and-thawing process becomes more plausible in future, because we’d have no reason to think that we’d chosen the right version of the technology.  We can only cryopreserve a person once: what if we’ve chosen the wrong technique?  How would we choose the best from an indefinitely large number of what we can at best treat as currently-implausible ones?

So how plausible is it to put a body on ice, then revive it many years later?  It’s been pointed out by some that we currently do preserve embryos without apparent ill-effect, with the implication that there’s no reason in principle why more developed humans couldn’t be frozen successfully.  However, whole humans are a wee bit more complex than embryos; it’s not at all clear that we can extrapolate from balls of a few cells to entire humans.  Even the admittedly limited experimental evidence that it’s possible to freeze whole organs won’t show us that, since we’re systems of organs.  One can accept that an organ is a system, too; but all that means is that we’re systems of systems – so we’ve squared the complexity.  And, of course, the timescales being considered here are tiny compared with the kind of timescales envisaged in cryonic fantasies. more…

Dissenting from care.data: an analysis of opt out forms

14 Nov, 16 | by miriamwood

Guest Post: Paraskevas Vezyridis

Article: Dissenting from Care.data: An Analysis of Opt-out Forms

In our article, which is part of a wider project examining the technical, social and ethical challenges of big data in primary care, we simply wanted to explore how varied opt out forms can be when there is no standardised form available. We took as our case study opt out forms from care.data; the highly controversial (scrapped in July 2016) programme of work by NHS England and the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) to extract and link (in one central database) healthcare information from GP practices and other NHS and social care services for all sorts of administrative and research purposes. This was an important research question for us since wordings, available options and even design layouts could influence the decision of patients whether to allow the sharing of their GP record for the care.data programme.

While it relies on the individual’s inertia (and often lack of awareness) an opt out is usually considered a more practical and valid approach to consent when compared to an opt in, particularly for low risk, population level studies where highly representative samples are required. For care.data, two types of opt outs were possible: data would either not be extracted from GP records and/or shared outside of the HSCIC in any identifiable form. However, there was no standardised opt out form released, like with the Summary Care Records (SCR). GPs had to come up with their own forms to register patients’ dissent. We searched websites of GP practices to retrieve around 100 unique forms. We did not examine the information provided on GP practices’ websites. While there are around 8,000 GP practices in England, we believe that our sample was big enough to study any evident variability and make a point about the need to standardise these forms so that everyone, from GPs to patients, is on the same page.

What was striking for us was that, while the majority of these forms provided patients with the 2 types of objection, there were some forms that provided only one option (opt out from care.data altogether). There was also variability in other information provided: who was responsible for this programme (HSCIC and NHS England), what was it about and it was important for the NHS and researchers, where patients could have found more information, how data was to be protected, who could had access to this data and whether the programme had any support, for example, by a healthcare professional association.

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The End is Not What it Seems – Feasibility of Conducting Prospective Research in Critically Ill, Dying Patients.

14 Oct, 16 | by miriamwood

Guest Post by Amanda Van Beinum

Re: Feasibility of conducting prospective observational research on critically ill, dying patients in the intensive care unit

Collecting information about how people die in the intensive care unit is important. Observations about what happens during the processes of withdrawal of life sustaining therapies (removal of breathing machines and drugs used to maintain blood pressure) can be used to improve the care of dying patients. This information can also be used to improve processes of organ donation. But when the Determination of Death Practices in Intensive Care Units (DDePICT) research group first proposed to start collecting prospective data on dying and recently dead patients, a common response from other clinical researchers was, “You’re going to do what?” The research community did not believe that prospective research using an informed consent model would be possible in patients dying after withdrawal of life sustaining therapies in the intensive care unit.

While the clinical research community supported the “big picture” idea behind conducting this research, they were skeptical about our prospective research design and our intent to obtain full informed consent from all families prior to the patient’s death. Some also felt that we would have a hard time obtaining institutional ethics board approval or would encounter barriers from research coordinators uncomfortable with approaching families for consent at a difficult and emotional time in the patient’s care. However, the DDePICt group was persistent, and succeeded in their efforts to design the first prospective, observational pilot study in Canada of patients dying in the intensive care unit after withdrawal of life sustaining therapies. As part of the study design, the DDePICt pilot study collected data for an ethics sub-study to investigate how these anticipated challenges were overcome. The ethics sub-study sought an answer to the question; can we conduct ethical, prospective, observational research on a critically ill and imminently dying population in the intensive care unit?

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Where to Publish and Not to Publish in Bioethics

5 May, 16 | by bearp

Guest Post by Stefan Eriksson & Gert Helgesson, Uppsala University

* Note: this is a cross-posting from The Ethics Blog, hosted by the Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics (CRB) at Uppsala University. The link to the original article is here. Re-posted with permission of the authors.

Introduction

Allegedly, there are over 8,000 so-called predatory journals out there. Instead of supporting readers and science, these journals serve their own economic interests first and at best offer dubious merits for scholars. We believe that scholars working in any academic discipline have a professional interest and a responsibility to keep track of these journals. It is our job to warn the young or inexperienced of journals where a publication or editorship could be detrimental to their career. Even with the best of intent, researchers who publish in these journals inadvertently subject themselves to criticism. We have seen “predatory” publishing take off in a big way and noticed how colleagues start to turn up in the pages of some of these journals. This trend, referred to by some as the dark side of publishing, needs to be reversed.

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Circumcision and Sexual Function: Bad Science Reporting Misleads Parents

22 Apr, 16 | by bearp

by Brian D. Earp / (@briandavidearp)

Introduction

Another day, another round of uncritical media coverage of an empirical study about circumcision and sexual function. That’s including from the New York Times, whose Nicholas Bakalar has more or less recycled the content of a university press release without incorporating any skeptical analysis from other scientists. That’s par for the course for Bakalar.[1]

The new study is by Jennifer Bossio and her colleagues from Queen’s University in Ontario, Canada: it looked at penile sensitivity at various locations on the penis, comparing a sample of men who had been circumcised when they were infants (meaning they had their foreskins surgically removed), with a sample of men who remained genitally intact (meaning they kept their foreskins into adulthood).[2]

What did the researchers discover? According to a typical headline from the past few days:

Circumcision does not reduce penis sensitivity.”

But that’s not what the study showed. Before we get into the details of the science, and looking just at this claim from the “headline” conclusion, it might be helpful to review some basic anatomy.

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A Tool to Help Address Key Ethical Issues in Research

22 Feb, 16 | by BMJ

Guest post by Rebecca H. Li and Holly Fernandez Lynch

One of the most important responsibilities of a clinical project lead at a biotech company or an academic research team is to generate clinical trial protocols. The protocol dictates how a trial will be conducted and details background information on prior research, scientific objectives, study rationale, research methodology and design, participant eligibility criteria, anticipated risks and benefits, how adverse events will be handled, plans for statistical analysis, and other topics. Many protocol authors use as a starting point a “standardised” protocol template from their funder or institution. These templates often provide standard language, and sections for customisation, sometimes with various “pick-and-choose” options based on the nature of the research. They inevitably cover each of the key topics listed above, but often fail to include ethical principles and considerations beyond the regulatory requirement of informed consent. Indeed, the process of protocol writing has traditionally focused on scientific detail, with ethical analysis often left to institutional review boards (IRBs) and research ethics committees (RECs); unfortunately, robust discussion of specific ethical issues is often absent from clinical trial protocols.

When IRBs and RECs convene to review protocols, they are expected to evaluate whether the study will adequately protect enrolled participants. When the protocol fails to address potential ethical concerns explicitly, reviewers are left to speculate: did the investigator consider the concern, but dismiss it as not relevant in this particular context; did the investigator fail to understand the concern; does the investigator have an appropriate plan in place to resolve the concern, but has left it unstated in the protocol? This uncertainty can contribute to delays as reviewers debate among themselves, and can require lengthy back-and-forth with researchers, including series of protocol revisions and re-reviews until clarity is established. In some cases, it may also be that reviewers with less experience or expertise fail to identify an ethical concern that has not been brought to their attention in a protocol. more…

The Unbearable Asymmetry of Bullshit

16 Feb, 16 | by bearp

By Brian D. Earp (@briandavidearp)

* Note: this article was first published online at Quillette magazine. The official version is forthcoming in the HealthWatch Newsletter; see http://www.healthwatch-uk.org/.

Introduction

Science and medicine have done a lot for the world. Diseases have been eradicated, rockets have been sent to the moon, and convincing, causal explanations have been given for a whole range of formerly inscrutable phenomena. Notwithstanding recent concerns about sloppy research, small sample sizes, and challenges in replicating major findings—concerns I share and which I have written about at length — I still believe that the scientific method is the best available tool for getting at empirical truth. Or to put it a slightly different way (if I may paraphrase Winston Churchill’s famous remark about democracy): it is perhaps the worst tool, except for all the rest.

Scientists are people too

In other words, science is flawed. And scientists are people too. While it is true that most scientists — at least the ones I know and work with — are hell-bent on getting things right, they are not therefore immune from human foibles. If they want to keep their jobs, at least, they must contend with a perverse “publish or perish” incentive structure that tends to reward flashy findings and high-volume “productivity” over painstaking, reliable research. On top of that, they have reputations to defend, egos to protect, and grants to pursue. They get tired. They get overwhelmed. They don’t always check their references, or even read what they cite. They have cognitive and emotional limitations, not to mention biases, like everyone else.

At the same time, as the psychologist Gary Marcus has recently put it, “it is facile to dismiss science itself. The most careful scientists, and the best science journalists, realize that all science is provisional. There will always be things that we haven’t figured out yet, and even some that we get wrong.” But science is not just about conclusions, he argues, which are occasionally (or even frequently) incorrect. Instead, “It’s about a methodology for investigation, which includes, at its core, a relentless drive towards questioning that which came before.” You can both “love science,” he concludes, “and question it.”

I agree with Marcus. In fact, I agree with him so much that I would like to go a step further: if you love science, you had better question it, and question it well, so it can live up to its potential.

And it is with that in mind that I bring up the subject of bullshit.

more…

What should Investigators be Doing with Unexpected Findings in Brain Imaging Research?

22 Jun, 15 | by BMJ

Guest Post by Caitlin Cole

Incidental findings in brain imaging research are common. Investigators can discover these unexpected findings of potential medical significance in up to 70% of their research scans. However, there are no standards to guide investigators as to whether they should actively search for these findings or which, if any, they should return to research participants.

This complex ethical issue impacts many groups in brain imaging: participants and parents of child participants who may desire relevant health information, but alternatively may suffer from anxiety and financial burden; investigators who must ethically grant their participants autonomy, but who also may suffer from budget and personnel restrictions to manage the review and report of these findings; Institutional Review Board (IRB) members who must provide ethical oversight to imaging research and help mandate institutional standards; and health providers who must interface with their patients and assist with follow up care when necessary.

Our research study shows these groups share some ideas on the ethics of returning incidental findings – the researcher has an ethical responsibility or obligation to tell a subject that there’s something there, however they do it, but just inform the subject, even though it’s not part of the research” – yet also acknowledge the inherent risk in reporting medical research information. As one of our IRB members commented, I mean [in regards to withholding findings] one reason would be to protect the patient from doing something stupid about them.

When participants are asked about incidental findings, they consistently state that they want to receive all information pertinent to their health. Research participants want to make their own medical decisions and feel investigators have a responsibility to keep them informed.

However, it is clear from our research that participants do not always understand the difference between a brain scan for research purposes and a clinical scan. The incidental finding reports that they receive include personal health information, written in medical jargon, discovered during a clinical procedure that may have immediate or long term medical significance. Because of this crossover between conducting research and sharing health information, participants may overestimate the clinical utility of the reported research information. This is a challenge for investigators whose role is to conduct research, not to diagnose participants or offer findings with clinical certainty. Participant assumptions otherwise have the potential to cause downstream legal complications for the research institution.

It is necessary to understand the impact on all parties involved in the process of disclosing incidental findings to determine appropriate management policy. This challenging task should not be underestimated as these groups think differently about the balance between risk and benefit based on their role in this process, whether they be a research participant, a research investigator, an IRB member or a health provider. Overall there is an ethical demand to manage and report unexpected findings discovered in brain imaging research; finding a way to do this while minimizing negative impact for all involved is important.

Read the full paper here.

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