By Sanne van der Marck

Although abortion is an important component of women’s reproductive healthcare in many countries, it continues to be a highly debated issue. Central to this debate is the moral status of the foetus and the rights of the pregnant individual, in particular their right to bodily autonomy. And while medical risks are often used to demonstrate the physical burden of pregnancy, the subjective experience of pregnancy and parenthood is rarely taken into account in both the medical discourse on pregnancy and the academic discourse on reproductive rights and ethics. This is problematic because without considering the lived experiences of pregnant individuals, we risk developing incomplete ethical frameworks that do not reflect the lives of the people affected by the decisions that are made from these frameworks. This lack of representation will have consequences for our policies, which are often grounded in ethical frameworks.

The discussion on the morality of abortion is often principle-based and revolves around the question whether the right to life of the foetus overrides the right to bodily autonomy of the pregnant individual. But this focus on bodily autonomy risks concealing the reason why pregnant individuals may choose for an abortion. This is not always because they do not want to pregnant or do not want to take up parental obligations, but because they do not want a child to come into existence. This nuance is important, because it asks us to evaluate what it means to have a child beyond the physical sacrifices of a pregnancy, and to look at the existential impact instead; a dimension that is often left out of the abortion discussion.

Technological advancements within the reproductive sciences, in particular ectogenesis, bring this existential dimension more clearly into view. If it becomes possible to safely extract a foetus for gestation in an artificial womb, a pregnant individual can not only opt out of parental obligations but also out of a pregnancy without harming the foetus. What is still the case, however, is that the pregnant person will have to live in a world-with-child. The particulars of this existential dimension, however, are still to be described.

Phenomenology seeks to describe and understand structures, meanings, and essences of specific phenomena without presupposing any theoretical frameworks or interpretations. As such, phenomenology is an excellent tool to determine the existential impact of a world-with-child. By applying phenomenological principles to the subjective experience of pregnancy and parenthood, we can gain insights into the embodied, intentional, and intersubjective aspects of these phenomena. This approach allows us to consider not only the physical and emotional dimensions of becoming a parent, but also the relational and temporal transformations it entails. Phenomenology can thus illuminate how pregnancy and parenthood reshape one’s sense of self and their understanding of the world.

In my article, I argue that ethical debates about abortion must take this existential impact seriously. Pregnancy is not only a biological process but a transformative experience that can fundamentally alter one’s identity, relationships, and way of being in the world. Even in cases where a pregnant person does not become a caregiver, such as through adoption or future technologies like ectogenesis, the world may still irrevocably shift into a world-with-child. By acknowledging this dimension, we may move toward an ethical framework grounded in lived reality. Only then can we ensure that reproductive policies and moral arguments truly reflect the depth and complexity of what it means to carry, bear, or refuse to bring a child into the world.

Author: Sanne van der Marck

Affiliation: Ghent University

Social Media: LinkedIn

Conflicts of Interest: None to declare