Ethics, iBlastoids, and brain organoids: Time to revise antiquated laws and processes

By Julian Savulescu.

Jose Polo and his team at Monash University have successfully reprogrammed human adult cells (fibroblasts – skin cells) to form “iBlastoids”. These are structures which are like early human embryos. Normally when a sperm enters an egg, it produces a new cell, which divides, and these cells divide until a blastocyst is formed in the first week, consisting of 200-300 cells. In normal embryonic development, this would implant in the uterus. However, iBlastoids can’t do this as they lack the normal membrane that surrounds the blastocyst. They cannot by themselves form a fetus or baby.

They will be useful to study early human development and why so many embryos die soon after formation. They can be used to study mutations or the effect of toxins, perhaps developing treatments for infertility. So far, they have only been allowed to develop to the equivalent of a day-11 blastocyst. It is not clear whether they can produce the precursors to brain development:

“the developmental potential of iBlastoids as a model for primitive streak formation and gastrulation remains to be determined, and will require an international conversation on the applicability of the 14-day rule to iBlastoids.” (Excerpt from the team’s Nature article)

In many parts of the world, such as Australia and the UK, experimentation on embryos, including cloned embryos, is only allowed up until 14 days. Since these structures (iBlastoids) cannot produce a live born baby, they appear not to be embryos on the common-sense definition of the term. However, the Australian Regulator (NHMRC Embryo Licensing Committee) has deemed otherwise:

“Although Australia’s regulator has decided existing laws cover the artificial embryos, the law may need to be rewritten to fully address them, experts said. International guidelines are already being worked on. Strict new prohibitions banning taking artificial embryos full-term will be needed.” (Liam Mannix, writing in the Sydney Morning Herald)

The philosophical absurdity of calling these embryos is easily seen. The only plausible way an iBlastoid could be considered an embryo is:

  • iBlastoids are embryos because if a membrane (zona pellucida) were added, these could implant possibly forming a live born baby.

But then skin cells would also be embryos because:

  • Skin cells can produce an iBlastoid if they are reprogrammed, and iBlastoids are embryos.

Nevertheless, even if one were to believe this is not an embryo, it is very close to an embryo, a cloned embryo. (Indeed, cloning is a word conspicuously absent from the discussion of these.) If it were able to develop neural structures, those might resemble previously described “brain organoids.”

This is a related technology which reprogrammes adult cells to form primitive neurons which can organise in culture (in a dish) into neural structures, some of which resemble foetuses of around 10 weeks (which Julian Koplin and I have written about briefly here and in more depth here). This technology has also raised concerns: Could such organoids support consciousness if allowed to develop?

Elsewhere I have argued that we need to rethink our laws around brain organoids. Currently, many laws consider these as tissues, not as potentially brains with special moral status.

Indeed, iBlastoids also give rise to the need to rethink laws, many of which were formed over 20 years ago. There are good reasons to rethink the 14 day limit – consciousness does not occur until around 20 weeks of development. And there are good reasons to consider whether there should be limits on future brain organoid research, if there is the possibility of organoids in the future that are sufficiently advanced to develop consciousness.

Both iBlastoids and brain organoids call into question what matters. What does matter is our mind, which is the result of organised and complex electrical activity in our brains. Once we start to get an organism – whatever it is – which has this, we are in ethically controversial territory.

Prior to that we are dealing with human cells, tissues or “structures.” We should facilitate research that will lead to important knowledge about human development and potentially generate treatments for human disease.

There is no good reason to draw a line at 14 days – the neural structures at that point are primitive and the potential for twinning is morally irrelevant (these were the two rationalisations offered by Mary Warnock). It was a political compromise introduced by Mary Warnock in the 1980s to get IVF and embryo research going. It is 40 years later and the science has radically changed.

Science progresses exponentially; the law develops at a near flat line. It is time to facilitate unproblematic iBlastoid and brain organoid research (as is currently occurring) but institute new limits that are linked to an ethically relevant waymark: if and when the new entity might be conscious in the future. Prior to that point, it does not matter whether it was cloned, or formed by natural reproduction.

Indeed, it would be an opportune moment to give up trying to form laws in this and other rapidly advancing areas. Gene editing is another example where old laws strain or burst under new technological advances. A better regulatory model might be a responsible body that could engage in public consultation, and consider new developments against legal and ethical principles, in the context of specific technologies. When it comes to radical new technologies, what matters is the spirit, not the letter of the law.

Author: Julian Savulescu

Affiliations: 

Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and Wellcome Centre for Ethics, University of Oxford

Biomedical Ethics Research Group, Murdoch Children’s Research Institute

Competing interests: None declared

Social media account of post author: @juliansavulescu

 

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