25 Jun, 14 | by Iain Brassington
No surprises at the result, but the ruling itself looks like it might make for interesting reading. Analysis to follow…
25 Jun, 14 | by Iain Brassington
No surprises at the result, but the ruling itself looks like it might make for interesting reading. Analysis to follow…
7 Jun, 14 | by BMJ
Guest Post by Bram Wispelwey, Ari Zivotofsky, and Alan Jotkowitz
Much has been made of the fact that over the last two decades HIV has transformed from an inevitable, agonising killer into a controllable chronic disease. But have we reached a point where infecting someone with HIV in order to avoid other, potentially worse health outcomes might be justified? In the realm of organ transplantation we found that if we are not yet there, perhaps we should be.
Our paper was in part inspired by what many considered a shocking ruling by former Israeli Chief Rabbi Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron, who decreed that it was consistent with Jewish religious law for HIV-negative individuals to receive HIV-positive organ transplants, even if the evidence indicates a possibility for the recipient to contract the disease. Many considered this opinion premature because only recently had HIV-positive individuals been found to be good candidates for solid organ transplantation, and doctors in South Africa were still in the early research stages of examining kidney transplantation between HIV-positive individuals. But in examining the ethical considerations of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice, we argue in our paper that Rabbi Bakshi-Doron’s opinion is ethically sound.
Focusing on the history of HIV in transplantation and using a comparison to current practice with regard to another infectious disease, cytomegalovirus, we demonstrate that disallowing HIV-negative candidates from receiving HIV-positive organs would be a significant limit on patient autonomy. The elimination of the ban on this type of potentially life-saving (and improving) donation may also represent a more socially just option, as it would expand the donor pool and engender cost savings. HIV-positive to HIV-positive donation will soon be a reality in several countries; it’s time to think about going one step further.
Read the full paper here.
5 Jun, 14 | by Iain Brassington
Yes, yes: it’s tedious and internecine, but it’s almost a year since I had a pop at Kevin Yuill’s book on assisted dying; how about an update? Well, conveniently, there’s this, in which he tries “to convince my fellow liberal minded atheists to reconsider their support for legalized assisted dying”. OK, then. First up, this isn’t a pro-legalisation post: I’m much more interested in looking at the arguments presented in their own terms. I think they’re bad; but that is to do with their form rather than their content. Indeed, one of Yuill’s opening moves is something to which I’m sympathetic: in respect of Lord Falconer’s latest Bill to legalise assisted dying, he points out that
the chief sponsoring agency (Dignity in Dying) lamely differentiates between the dying (those with six months or less to live) and those with more time.If the latter ingest poison in a room by themselves – well, that’s suicide. But if those with less than six months take poison with the intent to end their lives, that is not suicide at all but <ahem> assisted dying. Nope, me neither.
I agree that the six-month time limit is arbitrary, and probably morally indefensible. But…
But note how Yuill botches even this point. more…
1 Jun, 14 | by Iain Brassington
There’s a nice little piece by Martin Robbins in this week’s Guardian in which he talks about the fact that women seem to be less supportive of abortion than men. That does seem counterintuitive, given that… well, given the obvious physiological facts and the relative burden of risks related to pregnancy. So there’s an interesting little anthropological puzzle here; and he suggests a number of factors that might explain the phenomenon. For example, there’s some research that finds that women are more likely than men to agree that life begins at conception – though, as he points out, while that might help explain the different views of termination, we’d still need to know why more women think that to begin with. Another potential explanation is that men like the idea of not having to do the right thing by their pregnant partners by paying child-support or, if you’re reading this in the 1950s, marrying them: abortion gives a way out of that. But – and Robbins doesn’t mention this – that again presupposes keeping the baby as the default position to which people are looking for an alternative. We could also talk about social pressure, and the way that women are still expected to be mothers, and how that feeds into attitudes. In fact, we could talk about a lot of things:
So which is it? Internalised sexism, men’s liberation, fundamentally different ideas about the point at which life begins, or something else entirely? I doubt only one factor is at work, but it seems that we lack a definitive answer. And that’s a shame, because in the ongoing battle of ideas it seems like a very important question to ask.
I suspect some will deride his “we need to do more research” conclusion, but it seems eminently sensible to say that, faced with a quirk of attitudes, a full explanation would be at least aesthetically satisfying, even if not especially urgent. He also provides lots of useful links.
28 May, 14 | by Iain Brassington
There’re probably times when all of us have had a solution, and just had to find a problem for it. It’s an easy trap; and it’s one into which I suspect Gretchen Goldman may have fallen in an article in Index on Censorship about scientific freedom and how it’s under threat from disputes about Federal funding in the US. No: I’m not going to be arguing against scientific freedom here. Only against a certain use of the appeal to scientific freedom in response to a particular problem. First up, let’s note the points on which Goldman may well be correct. She notes that the disputes in the US about federal funding that have led to big cuts and a short-but-total government shutdown are very bad for science. She points out that political machinations even meant that researchers working in government-funded areas couldn’t access their emails. This had direct and indirect consequences, all of which were pretty undesirable. For example,
[m]any government scientists were not allowed to access email, much less their laboratories. One scientist noted that his “direct supervisor … confiscated all laptop computers on the day of the shutdown”.
Without access to work email accounts, federal scientists were also prevented from carrying out professional activities that went beyond their government job duties. Several scientists pointed out that their inability to access emails significantly slowed down the peer-review process and, therefore, journal publication.
In the wider sense, to have science and funding bodies that are vulnerable to political shenanigans isn’t good for science, and is probably not good for humanity. You don’t have to think that research is obligatory to think that it’s often quite a good thing for science to happen all the same. And shutdowns are particularly bad for students and junior researchers, whose future career might depend on the one project they’re doing at the moment; if a vital field trip or bit of analysis or experiment is liable to get pulled at almost any moment, they don’t have a reputation yet to tide them over.
So far, so good. However, things are iffier elsewhere. more…
19 May, 14 | by David Hunter
Those outside of Australia are probably at best peripherally aware of the furore that the current budget announced by the new government last week is causing – it is in many ways an unsurprising budget for a broadly rightwing socially conservative government and quite reminiscent of the policies the Con-Dems have brought in the UK (attacks on public services, deregulation of higher education) against the background of a similar rhetoric of economic necessity and being all in it together, needing to clean up the mess left behind by the (kinda, almost, nominally) leftwing former government. It has managed thus far to reverse the popularity of the preferred leaders, and political parties so the fall out may be quite significant.
One interesting winkle it introduced was the introduction of a new medical research future fund (we are told ultimately it will be the largest in the world) which the majority of the significant cuts to public expenditure on health care would be channelled into and in particular of the new $7 co-payment that patients would be asked to pay to go to the GP(doctor) $5 would go to this new fund.
Obviously this is at least partially a cynical attempt to force the health cuts through the Senate (since if Labour votes against it as they say they will and succeed in stopping this policy then the Liberals can cast them as wanting the electorate to die of cancer…) sort of the equivalent of what is known as pork barrelling in the US.
And here you go a direct quote from the Minister for Health:
“People should understand that if they don’t want to put money into medical research then they can go down the obstructionist path of Labor and the Greens,”
Nonetheless there is an interesting question of whether this tradeoff is ethically acceptable? I wrote a little something about it here.
Unsurprisingly I think typically it won’t be because the cut backs to public health and new co-payments being imposed disproportionately disadvantage those worst off in society and the benefits will disproportionately accrue to those already well off – due to the cost of entry for new medical treatments, differing life expectancies and the likely focuses of medical research.
If the fund focused on disadvantage, health generally conceived and there was a guarantee that evidence generated would be listened to by government then it could be a force for good, but how likely is that?
16 May, 14 | by Iain Brassington
So: what is one to make of Conchita Wurst? I’ve not heard the song that won Eurovision this year, but I’m willing to bet that the world would be a better place if every entrant had been thrown into the Køge Bay before a single note was struck. But that might just be me.
Writing in the Telegraph, Brendan O’Neill has other concerns. Why, oh why, oh why can’t people just use the pronoun “he” when referring to Wurst? Wurst was born a man; therefore the male pronoun is more appropriate. (He’s never one to duck the important issues of the day, is Bren.) “Did everyone overnight transmogrify into a Gender Studies student and imbibe the unhinged idea that gender is nothing more than a ‘playful’ identity?” he asks. More: the fact that people refer to Wurst with the feminine pronoun is a symptom of what he calls “today’s speedily spreading cult of relativism”, and allowing people to choose their identity is “narcissistic”.
Now, let’s just ignore for the moment that Conchita Wurst is a character, and so it makes perfect sense to call her “her” in just the same way that one might use “her” to refer to Dame Edna Everage. (Thanks to someone I don’t know on Facebook for making that analogy – it’s a good ‘un.) O’Neill sort-of-acknowledges that, but he doesn’t let that minor point get in the way of a more general rant against people preferring to be referred to by one pronoun rather than another. For example, he takes this swipe at Chelsea Manning:
11 May, 14 | by Iain Brassington
There was an interesting article published in the BMJ a few days ago on the subject of athletes and their sex. Here’s the opening gambit:
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) and international sports federations have recently introduced policies requiring medical investigation of women athletes known or suspected to have hyperandrogenism. Women who are found to have naturally high testosterone levels and tissue sensitivity are banned from competition unless they have surgical or pharmaceutical interventions to lower their testosterone levels.
The primary justification offered seems to be one of reducing unfair advantage, with a secondary justification that investigations of this sort might be to the medical advantage of the athletes themselves. Rebecca Jordan-Young and her colleagues aren’t impressed, and think that the policy is ethically suspect: not the least of their worries is that the policy effectively medicalises an unusual but benign characteristic of some people. This could lead to medically useless surgery. However, the potential problems are wider than that:
When pharmacological intervention or gonadectomy is a precondition for eligibility to compete, an athlete has to make a profound life and health altering decision for non-medical reasons. These are not merely individual decisions: athletes are embedded in families, teams, organisations, and even nations that depend on them to compete. Athletes can be “regarded as vulnerable to undue, even extreme situational pressures arising from the decision-making environment,” especially when a competitive career is also a path to economic mobility and stability.
I have to admit that I’m fairly relaxed about surgical interventions being undergone for non-medical reasons; more…
1 May, 14 | by BMJ
Guest post by Tina Rulli and Joseph Millum
It is commonly thought that individuals have a moral duty to rescue others in peril. Bioethicists have leveraged this duty to rescue for a variety of purposes—including to criticize the use of placebo controls in trials in developing countries; to defend duties of researchers to return urgent incidental findings and provide ancillary care; to argue for a duty to become an organ donor; to defend allocating resources to develop drugs for rare diseases and to fund costly end of life care.
Despite their widespread use, there are serious problems with the two most cited duties to rescue: the individual duty of easy rescue and the institutional rule of rescue. The latter—the psychological tendency to support allocation of large amounts of money to rescuing identifiable victims at the opportunity cost of helping anonymous others—is indefensible. (See Peter Singer’s opinion piece in the Washington Post criticizing donations to Make-a-Wish). The former can be defended, but has its own problems. One concerns its force: does it really apply only to very low-cost rescues? Consideration of physicians’ duties to warn suggests otherwise. Another problem concerns its scope: whom do I have to rescue? If it applies to everyone who needs rescue, even low-cost rescues may place enormous demands on individuals (cf Peter Singer’s famous essay: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”).
We identify two further conceptions of the duty to rescue that have received less attention. An institutional duty of easy rescue would justify spending institutional dollars on rescue cases that are not too costly, while leaving room for institutions to fulfill lesser, but still important needs of others. A professional duty to rescue recognizes the more demanding duties certain medical professionals have. Both provide traction in answering some outstanding rescue dilemmas. We conclude our paper by proposing research priorities for bioethicists to help researchers and doctors sort through the obligations they have to people in need of medical rescue.
Read the full paper in the JME here.
23 Apr, 14 | by Iain Brassington
There’s a provocative piece in a recent New Scientist about what happens to unclaimed bodies after death – about, specifically, the practice of coopting them for research purposes.
Gareth Jones, who wrote it, points out that the practice has been going on for centuries – but that a consequence of the way it’s done is that it tends to be the poor and disenfranchised whose corpses are used:
[T]he probably unintended and unforeseen result [of most policies] was to make poverty the sole criterion for dissection. [... U]nclaimed bodies are still used in countries including South Africa, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Brazil and India. While their use is far less in North America, they continue to constitute the source of cadavers in around 20 per cent of medical schools in the US and Canada. In some states in the US, unclaimed bodies are passed to state anatomy boards.
For Jones, the practice of cooption ought to be stopped. His main bone of contention is the lack of consent – it’s a problem that’s made more acute by the fact that the bodies of the disenfranchised are more likely to be unclaimed, but I take it that the basic concern would be there for all.
One question that we might want to ask right from the off is why informed consent is important. more…
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