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Enhancement

Amoral Enhancement

10 Oct, 16 | by miriamwood

Guest Post by Saskia Verkiel

Re: Amoral Enhancement

A reply to Douglas’ reply to Harris’ reply to Douglas regarding the issue of freedom in cases of biomedical moral enhancement

Wouldn’t it be awesome if we could just swallow a pill and become better people?

With many aspects of life, growing numbers of people are embracing biomedical interventions to improve physical or cognitive performance and endurance, whether indicated for those purposes or not. Think doping in sports. Think Ritalin in college. Think beta blockers in stage performers. Think modafinil in pilots and surgeons who have to be alert for long stretches of time.

The funny thing is that when it comes to moral enhancement, we tend to think more in terms of its application to others, who are ‘obviously’ not such good people. Swindlers. Rapists. Basically all kinds of performers of crime.

Thomas Douglas was the first to write an analysis specifying when certain kinds of biomedical moral enhancement would be permissible, in 2008, and he realised that it’s important to make this distinction of whom we want the enhancement for. He focused on voluntarily enhancing the self. It’s a jolly nice read.

This paper triggered a cascade of replies.

To be fair, seeing the replies fly back and forth in this debate is not unlike watching a ballgame, albeit more enlightening (or so I think). Compare with Monty Python’s Philosophers’ Football. There’s team “Let’s put it in the drinking water!” (roughly: Oxford) and there’s team “Hold it, hold it…” (captained by John Harris and including yours truly).

more…

We’re all Gonna Die… Eventually

6 Oct, 16 | by Iain Brassington

It might just be a product of the turnover of people with whom I have much professional contact, but I’ve not heard as much about human enhancement in the past couple of years as I had in, say, 2010.  In particular, there seems to be less being said about radical life extension.  Remember Aubrey de Grey and his “seven deadly things“?  The idea there was that senescence was attributable to seven basic processes; those basic processes are all perfectly scrutable and comprehensible biological mechanisms.  Therefore, the argument went, if we just put the time and effort into finding a way to slow, halt, or reverse them, we could slow, halt, or reverse aging.  Bingo.  Preventing senescence would also ensure maximum robustness, so accidents and illnesses would be less likely to kill us.  To all intents and purposes, we’d be immortal.  Some enterprising people of an actuarial mindset even had a go at predicting how long an immortal life would be.  Eventually, you’ll be hit by a bus.  But you might have centuries of life to live before that.

Dead easy.

I was always a bit suspicious of that.  The idea that death provides meaning to life is utterly unconvincing; but the idea that more life is always a good thing is unconvincing, too.  What are you going to do with it?  In essence, it’s one thing to feel miffed that one isn’t going to have the time and ability to do all the things that one wants to do: life is a necessary criterion for any good.  But that doesn’t mean that more life is worth having in its own right.  Centuries spent staring at a blank wall isn’t made any better by dint of being alive.

But a letter published this week in Nature suggests that there is an upper end to human lifespan after all.  In essence, the demographic data seem to suggest that there’s an upper limit to survivability.  That being the case, we should stop worrying about making people live longer and longer, and concentrate on what’s going on during the 125 years or so that Dong, Milholland and Vijg think is allotted to us. more…

Making Humans Morally Better Won’t Fix the Problems of Climate Change

25 Aug, 16 | by miriamwood

Guest Post by Bob Simpson, Monash University

Re: Climate change, cooperation and moral bioenhancement

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has repeatedly said that greenhouse gas emissions increase the likelihood of severe and irreversible harm for people and ecosystems. And in his State of the Union address in 2015, Barack Obama emphasised these problems, saying that climate change poses the greatest threat to humanity’s future. We’ve come to expect pronouncements like these. Political leaders and transnational policy institutions both have an important role to play in implementing the measures needed to address threats from climate change – measures like international economic agreements, energy sector reform, and technological research.

By contrast, we wouldn’t expect advocates of biotechnological human enhancement to be proposing solutions to climate change. What does human enhancement have to do with oceanic warming or greenhouse gas emissions? According to people like Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, who advocate “moral bio-enhancement”, these things are in fact related. They say that we should be finding ways to use biotechnological interventions to make people more trusting and altruistic towards strangers, and hence more willing to make personal sacrifices – like, say, dramatically reducing their carbon footprint – in order to cooperate in global policies aimed at mitigating the impact of climate change.

more…

Enhancement as Nothing More than Advantageous Bodily and Mental States

20 May, 16 | by BMJ

Guest Post by Hazem Zohny

Some bodily and mental states are advantageous: a strong immune system, a sharp mind, strength.  These are advantageous precisely because, in most contexts, they are likely to increase your chances of leading a good life.  In contrast, disadvantageous states – e.g. the loss of a limb, a sense, or the ability to recall things – are likely to diminish those chances.

One way to think about enhancement and disability is in such welfarist terms.  A disability is no more than a disadvantageous bodily or mental state, while to undergo an enhancement is to change that state into a more advantageous one – that is, one that is more conducive to your well-being.  This would hugely expand the scope of what is considered disabling or enhancing.  For instance, there may be all kinds of real and hypothetical things you could change about your body and mind that would (at least potentially) be advantageous: you could mend a broken arm or stop a tumour from spreading, but you could also vastly sharpen your senses, take a drug that makes you more likeable, stop your body from expiring before the age of 100, or even change the scent of your intestinal gases to a rosy fragrance.

Would all such changes be instances of enhancement? more…

Putting a Price on Empathy

12 Aug, 15 | by BMJ

Guest Post by Sarah Carter

My paper is another to add to the ever-increasing number of articles about moral (bio)enhancement – but why is this issue so important?  To take a cynical view: if we had a pill or injection that could make people more moral, less prone to harming others, and so on, it would likely be very attractive to governments (perhaps because of real concerns that we’re headed for disaster unless such steps are taken, or simply because it would save on policing and military bills).  So it’s very important to try to get our heads around this subject while it’s still something that’s merely an idea, rather than waiting until it’s something in our medicine cabinets.  This means thinking about and discussing everything from what moral enhancement would actually involve, right through to questioning how it should be distributed, regulated, and even – as my paper addresses – promoted to the public.

Writers such as Persson and Savulescu argue that there is a need to undertake moral bioenhancement as a means to avoid mankind wandering down the path of ultimate harm, but they concede that many people (especially those we might say to be most in need of moral bioenhancement) would be unlikely to undergo it willingly.  In 2014, Vojin Rakic suggested that incentives such as tax breaks, retirement benefits, schooling allowances, and affirmative action policies, should be used as a way to encourage people to undergo moral bioenhancement.  I think that Rakic’s idea, while prima facie sensible and reasonable, simply will not work. This is not due to issues of coercion or social justice that we would normally associate with the use of incentives, but rather because likely public perceptions of moral bioenhancement mean that the use of incentives for this purpose may present a taboo trade-off. more…

How to be a good (consequentialist) bioethicist…

6 Jul, 15 | by David Hunter

There has recently been a pattern of papers (and I am not going to identify which ones) which I take as being slightly embarrassing to academic bioethicists because they portray us in a less than flattering light because of the naive mistakes they seem to make, or the outlandish poorly argued claims they make. I have noted a trend for these to have come from relatively new, consequentialist bioethicists and being the helpful sort that I am, the aim of this blog post therefore is to help consequentialist bioethicists from falling into these pitfalls.

more…

Cochlear Implants and Minority Cultures

17 Jan, 13 | by Iain Brassington

A bit more on the cochlear implant thing that I’ve been mentioning off and on for the past couple of months.  William Mager posted a link to something a little while ago on why some members of the deaf community are against CIs.  This attitude had always puzzled me.  Anyway, this, by Christina Hartmann, is the thing to which he linked.

Not wanting one yourself, I can understand easily enough.  Not wanting one for your children based on uncertainty about their benefit, I can understand.  But being against them in principle?  Couldn’t get my head around that.  It always seemed a bit wilfully isolationist – a bit identity-politics.  Hartmann’s contribution, I think, makes things a bit clearer.

Without ASL, there is no Deaf community. We band together not because of our “hearing loss” but because of a common language.  Like English, Bengali, French, American Sign Language (ASL) informs the cultural underpinnings of the Deaf community. Deaf history shows the importance of ASL to Deaf people. It’s not something we’ll give up easily and gladly.

In the 1800s and early 1900s, many educators tried to eradicate ASL in favor of oralism. They wanted to assimilate deaf people into the “mainstream” community. Many deaf people suffered because of this. They received marginal education because they couldn’t understand the spoken language. One of the older deaf men that I knew in my childhood couldn’t get a job better than a janitor because he received no valuable education from his oral school.  They just tried to teach him how to talk, to no avail.

Amidst all of this, a vibrant community emerged. People would converge at Deaf schools and churches just for a chance to use their own language with someone else. A feeling of kinship grew in face of oppression. (Yes, trying to abolish a language and forcibly integrate people is oppression.)  Many Deaf people throughout history fought very hard for the right to sign and live on their own terms.  One example is the Gallaudet protests of the 1980s. The thought that this hard-earned culture will disappear because parents don’t want to learn ASL sparks abject fear and anger in many Deaf people.

And why not?  Wouldn’t you be angry if someone told you that your culture is outdated and irrelevant now?

This last sentence or two seems to me to be important.  CIs reduce the need for ASL (or BSL); SL sustains a culture; therefore CIs erode that culture. more…

Crime and the Less-Polluted City Solution

10 Jan, 13 | by Iain Brassington

People who listen to Today may have heard an article in the prime 8:10 slot on the 9th about the correlation between a drop in the use of leaded petrol, and a drop in violent crime rates.  (Mother Jones actually beat the BBC, having published a piece on the same research last week: I meant to post something then, but was buried by other stuff.)

The nub of the story is this: that violent crime has been falling in the past few years, and though this pattern seems to lag about 20 years behind a fall in the use of lead in petrol, the fit is pretty good: a decline in leaded petrol predicts a decline in violent crime by about two decades – which is just about the time that we might expect would elapse between the formation of the brain and the highest likelihood of violent behaviour in humans.  Neat.  The Mother Jones piece provides lots of links to the relevant research – links to this (from 1999), and this (from 2007), and this (from 2012).

If the lead hypothesis is sound, it seems to be ethically interesting in a couple of ways. For one thing, it opens the way to at least some antisocial behaviour to be seen as being symptomatic of a deeper public health problem.  That’s interesting enough as it is, but – admittedly – it might be little more than interesting, on the grounds that leaded petrol is pretty much a thing of the past anyway (Wikipedia says that, as of 2011, leaded petrol was widely available only in 7 countries).

But the other way in which it’s interesting has to do with arguments about so-called “moral enhancement”. more…

Cochlear Implant: On!

14 Dec, 12 | by Iain Brassington

A few weeks ago, I linked to a post on William Mager’s blog in which he said (a) that he was about to have a cochlear implant fitted, and (b) that he’d write about the experience as it progressed.

I don’t know how many readers of this blog followed the link or subscribed; for those who didn’t, I thought I’d just point you in the direction of the latest update.  In short: the implant was fitted; it was turned on; it was… unexpected.  Not completely pleasant from the word go, and a little odd.  But also… well:

I spent an hour yesterday walking round the house tapping different surfaces with a wooden drumstick. Before, with a hearing aid, I’d have heard these taps simply as a ‘tap’ sound. But I had a eureka moment when I realised that tapping a wooden stick on a wooden surface sounded different in pitch and tone to tapping on a glass surface, or a metal surface. Of course, I knew that was the case – but this was the first time ever, EVER… that I’d actually heard that and been able to distinguish so clearly between the different sounds.

That has to be a little bit magical, doesn’t it?

On the other hand, what he can hear is limited.  And so

[n]ow I’m sitting in a world of silence, punctuated by random, violent bursts of sounds that I’ve never heard or experienced quite in the same way before.

What I’m experiencing now isn’t hearing as I imagined it, or as I’ve known it for the last 30 years. It’s completely different, and it’s making me feel really tired and disconnected from everything. I’m finding it really hard to concentrate, to hold on to a specific thought for a long time. […]

Most disconcerting of all is the dawning realisation that what I thought I was hearing for the last 30 years of my life wasn’t actually hearing. It was just compressed, distorted garbage noise through a hearing aid. What I’m feeling in my head now is much, much closer to actual sound, but it isn’t sound.

I’m fairly confident in my hunch that being able to hear is on the whole preferable to not being able to hear; though there might be times when not hearing is preferable, being able to do so at least gives you the choice – which raises the intriguing possibility that someone with a device that he could used to switch his own hearing on or off might be, in that sense at least, very well off indeed: better off than someone with no ability to hear and someone with no ability not to.  (In just the same way, having a car is good all else being equal, even if there’re times when walking is preferable, because you have the option of using it.)

But still: it’s worth keeping in mind that the process of restoring – or instilling – hearing isn’t a straightforward leap from position A to more desirable position B.  There’s an ambiguity about it.  Even granted confidence that B is more desirable, we can’t take it for granted.

 

Enhancing the ill: The therapy-enhancement…

16 Nov, 12 | by David Hunter

This post is in effect a gauntlet, a challenge for those who are significantly bothered by enhancements, such that they think that enhancing would be unethical or at least that there is a significant ethical difference between the two, largely because I can’t really work out what the fuss is and would like someone to try and explain to me what worries them about enhancements and whether it applies in this case.

Therapy is usually distinguished from enhancement in the following manner – therapy is about restoring normal functioning whereas enhancement is about going beyond normal functioning. So for example I’m an asthmatic and sometimes I am prescribed steroids to enable my lungs to regain normal functioning. However if an otherwise healthy athlete took the same medication it would function as an enhancement, boosting them above normal performance.

Objectors to enhancement typically argue that there is a morally relevant difference between therapy and enhancement in that there are medical justifications to provide therapies on the grounds of justice/rights/equality but not enhancements. Hence there is a moral distinction because the state is obliged to provide (some) therapies but not, or at least the argument goes, enhancements.*1

And some commentators further argue that enhancements are unethical because of an array of reasons such as justice, risks, meddling with human nature and so on.

I want to suggest there is at least one class of enhancements where there is a solid medical justification to provide these. This is when something acts as both a therapy and an enhancement for someone – I’ll call these therapy-enhancements. A case will make it clearer which I’ll refer to as the Pinky & the Brain case.

Suppose we have someone who we will call Pinky who has a profoundly low IQ – let’s say 40, so low that they require substantial levels of state support to be able to live their life. Suppose there is a new drug A on the market that will increase the IQ of those with profoundly low IQ’s (and only those with these IQ’s) however it will increase their IQ’s significantly above species normal IQ levels of 100 to let’s say 160, hence transforming Pinky into Brain.*2 This seems to me to be a drug which is both providing a therapy since it raises them to a normal IQ and enhancing them as well since it raises them substantially beyond a normal IQ as well. If this drug is relatively speaking affordable – more cost effective than any present treatment they are getting then it seems to me obligatory that the state provide this despite it being an enhancement.*3

So this raises worries about how strong objections to enhancement can be, since if they are strong one might think we ought to forgo therapies that also enhance, which would seem to me to be unjust. We can strengthen this concern by considering a further case which raises questions for the strength of any morally relevant difference between therapy and enhancement.

Suppose that the pharma company who developed A, recognising the concerns some have about enhancement have developed a new drug B which like A raises the IQ of those with profoundly low IQ’s but unlike A it only raises them to the species norm of 100 – unfortunately due to the additional development costs, smaller market etc the company decides to charge twenty times the price of A. What should the state do, should it switch to B to avoid enhancing? I think clearly it ought not, and for me at least that intuition holds true until B is cheaper than or perhaps equal to A in price (in which case I’m vaguely indifferent but probably lean towards the free additional 60 IQ points). What this seems to show is that any normative force the distinction has is at best quite weak, easily over ruled by a slight increase in efficiency.

This doesn’t of course show that there is no morally relevant difference, merely that if there is one it is quite, quite weak.

*1 Of course this might be challenged since some things that look like things health care systems ought to provide such as vaccines seem to function more like enhancements than therapies.

*2 I’ll leave it up to you whether this increase in intellect induces what this lovely book (Soon I’ll be Invincible) refers to as Malign Hyper-Cognition Syndrome…

*3 Are there actual cases like this? I suspect the answer is probably yes – for example if a disabled athlete runs faster with their blades than they did before losing their legs this would be a case of a therapy-enhancement.

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