Organs and Payment: cui bono?
20 Oct, 11 | by Iain Brassington
Dipping in and out of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ recent report on organ donation (available in various forms from this page), I’ve been struck by a couple of things.
One is that the Council is painfully keen to maintain its distance from the idea that organs – especially those from live donors – could be sold. The report makes clear that not every form of payment for donation implies this kind of commodification, and is correct to do so. But, all the same, it’s pretty clear in its insistence that sale would be a Bad Thing. And, of course, this just invites fairly conventional arguments about whether, and why, sale of organs really would be so bad after all. One of the worries nodded towards here is the commodification objection – but it seems plain to me that it’s one thing for you to treat me or my body as a mere commodity, but quite another for me to treat my own body as such. And there’s also a difference – at least on the face of it – between being treated as a commodity and being treated merely as a commodity.
(On this note, I cringed at the way that Kant is mangled on p 120 of the full report. But that’s possibly just me and my soft spot for the Prussian weirdo.)
So far, so conventional. What really caught my attention – partly because it caught the attention of headline-writers in the news media – was the proposal that payment might be offered to defray the funeral costs of people whose organs could be used. more…
