24 Apr, 15 | by Iain Brassington
For my money, one of the best papers at the nonhuman animal ethics conference at Birmingham a couple of weeks ago was Steve Cooke’s.* He was looking at the justifications for direct action in the name of disrupting research on animals, and presented the case – reasonably convincingly – that the main arguments against the permissibility of such direct action simply don’t work. For him, there’s a decent analogy between rescuing animals from laboratories and rescuing drowning children from ponds: in both cases, if you can do so, you should, subject to the normal constraints about reasonable costs. The question then becomes one of what is a reasonable cost. He added to this that the mere illegality of such disruption mightn’t tip the balance away from action. After all, if a law is unjust (he claims), it’s hard to see how that alone would make an all-else-being-equal permissible action impermissible. What the law allows to be done to animals in labs is unjust, and so it doesn’t make much sense to say that breaking the law per se is wrong.
Now, I’m paraphrasing the argument, and ignoring a lot of background jurisprudential debate about obligations to follow the law. (There are those who think that there’s a prima facie obligation to obey the law qua law; but I think that any reasonable version of that account will have a cutoff somewhere should the law be sufficiently unjust.) But for my purposes, I don’t think that that matters.
It’s also worth noting that, at least formally, Cooke’s argument might be able to accommodate at least some animal research. If you can claim that a given piece of research is, all things considered, justifiable, then direct action to disrupt it might not have the same moral backing. Cooke thinks that little, if any, animal research is justified – but, again, that’s another, higher-order, argument.
One consideration in that further argument may be whether you think that there’s a duty to carry out (at least certain kinds of) research. more…
20 Apr, 15 | by Iain Brassington
Guest post by C Blease
Talking cures have never been so accessible. Since 2007 the UK government has invested £300 million launching its Improved Access to Psychological Treatments scheme. The goal is to train up to 4000 therapists in a particular branch of psychotherapy – cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). CBT is the most widely researched and most commonly used “talking therapy” in the world. It is also on the rise: globally, a quarter of all practicing therapists use it.
The UK government’s decision to invest in CBT seems praiseworthy: as Bob Hoskins used to counsel in the old BT adverts, “It’s good to talk”. It is certainly a sentiment shared by the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP) – which adopts the familiar tag line for its URL (www.itsgoodtotalk.org.uk).
On the face of it, this seems like good advice. Even a cursory look at the evidence base is encouraging. Meta-analyses show that around 80 per cent of people who undergo psychotherapy for the treatment of depression are better off than those who receive no treatments. They are also significantly less likely to relapse than those treated with antidepressants; some evidence even indicates that psychotherapy acts as a prophylactic, preventing future lapses into depression. Given that the WHO estimates that depression will be the leading cause of disability in the world by 2020, the health benefits of psychotherapy carry enormous promise. The potential relative healthcare costs of successfully treating (and preventing) depression with psychotherapy are significant too: in the UK depression incurs annual costs in lost earnings of £11 billion annually, and prescription rates for antidepressants are now at an all-time high.
Yet talking about talking cures is still taboo. more…
13 Apr, 15 | by Iain Brassington
This popped up on my FB feed yesterday: a proposal from the Australian government that certain child welfare payments should be withheld from parents who refuse to vaccinate their kids based on “conscientious objection”.
Parents who do not vaccinate their children will lose welfare payments of up to $2100 per child under a federal government policy set to be announced before the May budget.
Under changes that could save more than $50 million a year, Social Services Minister Scott Morrison is preparing to scrap a “conscientious objection” provision which allows anti-vaccination parents to still claim welfare benefits including childcare assistance and Family Tax Benefit A.
Fairfax Media understands the Family Tax Benefit A is worth up to $2100 per child.
What to make of the idea?
Well, I think that certain things can be taken more or less as read. The first is that vaccination is a good thing, and is quite possibly a prima facie duty. The second is that governments may, and perhaps must, encourage vaccination. So it looks as though an argument in defence of the idea could be valid. Measures to increase levels of vaccination are desirable; this is a measure that (if it works) would increase levels of vaccination; therefore this is desirable. We’d have to do a bit of work to see whether the argument actually does work – formal validity won’t guarantee that – but in the meantime, the policy may be justified on the basis that it’s reasonable to believe that it would work.
But that is not, of course, the whole story. Effectiveness is a necessary condition for a policy being justified, but it ain’t sufficient. It’s likely that there’s more to say. more…
Guest post by Alka Chandna
How many animals are experimented on in laboratories? It’s a simple question, the answer to which provides a basic parameter to help us wrap our heads around the increasingly controversial and ethically harrowing practice of locking animals in cages and conducting harmful procedures on them that are often scary, painful, and deadly. Yet ascertaining the answer in the United States – the world’s largest user of animals in experiments – is surprisingly difficult.
In the eyes of the US Animal Welfare Act (AWA) – the single federal law that governs the treatment of animals used in experimentation – not all animals are created equal. Mice, rats, and birds bred for experimentation, and all cold-blooded animals – estimated by industry to comprise more than 95 percent of all animals used – are all unscientifically and dumbfoundingly excluded from the AWA’s definition of “animal”. Orwell cheers from his grave while Darwin rolls in his.
Leaving aside the question of whether mice and rats should be categorized as vegetable or mineral, the exclusion of these animals from the AWA also results in a dearth of data on the most widely used species, as the only figures on animal use in US laboratories that are systematically collected, organized, and published by the government are on AWA-regulated species. more…
Guest post by Kirsty Keywood (University of Manchester)
On 11th March Nadine Montgomery won her case before the UK Supreme Court to gain compensation for the failure of her obstetrician to warn her of risks associated with the vaginal delivery of a large infant – a risk which she would have averted by requesting a caesarean section. Shortly after his birth, her son was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and a brachial plexus injury, resulting from the occlusion of the placenta during a “very stressful” vaginal delivery.
Nadine Montgomery had diabetes, which increased her chances of giving birth to a larger than average-sized baby. This, in conjunction with her small stature (she was 5 feet tall), indicated a risk that a natural delivery would bring with it a 9-10% chance of shoulder dystocia. Were dystocia to occur, attempts to dislodge the infant’s shoulders through mechanical manoeuvres would generate a risk of occlusion of the umbilical cord resulting in death or cerebral palsy of 0.1%. According to the obstetrician, Dr McLellan, the risk of shoulder dystocia did not merit specific mention in discussions with diabetic patients, because the risk of an adverse event associated with shoulder dystocia was very small indeed.
Mrs Montgomery’s case before the UK Supreme Court hinged on the question of the nature of the obstetrician’s duty to the patient. more…
3 Mar, 15 | by Iain Brassington
You must, by now, have heard of the Saudi Arabian blogger Raif Badawi. Just in case you haven’t (really?), here’s a potted biography: having set up the secularist forum Free Saudi Liberals, he was arrested for insulting Islam and showing disobedience. Among the formal charges he faced was one for apostasy, which carries the death penalty in Saudi. The apostasy charge was dropped, but he was convicted on other charges and sentenced to seven years in prison and 600 lashes. He appealed, and this sentence was changed: it became 1000 lashes and 10 years in prison. Why? Does it matter? Because Saudi Arabia. The latest update is that the apostasy charge may be renewed, so for a second time, he faces beheading. Part of the evidence against him is that he “Liked” a post on a Facebook page for Arab Christians. (Remember: Saudi is one of our allies against religious extremism.)
The lashes were to be administered in batches of 50, weekly, after Friday prayers. As I write this, he has only been flogged once; doctors have attested that he is not well enough to be flogged again. And – with thanks to Ophelia for the link – it’s not hard to see why:
Dr Juliet Cohen, head of doctors at Freedom from Torture, explained: “When the cane strikes, the blood is forced from the tissues beneath… Damage to the small blood vessels and individual cells causes leakage of blood and tissue fluid into the skin and underlying tissue, increasing the tension in these areas.
“The more blows are inflicted on top of one another, the more chance of open wounds being caused. This is important because they are likely to be more painful and at risk of infection, which will cause further pain over a prolonged period as infection delays the wounds’ healing.”
There is also the long-term damage done to the victim’s mental health caused by flogging.
“Psychologically, flogging may cause feelings of fear, anxiety, humiliation and shame. Anticipation of the next scheduled flogging is likely to cause heightened emotions especially of fear, anxiety and difficulty sleeping… pain and fear together over a prolonged period have a deeply debilitating effect and recovery from such experiences may take considerable time,” said Cohen.
At the beginning of February, Vincent Iacopino had a post on the main BMJ blog in which he claimed that health professionals should play no part in Badawi’s flogging: more…
1 Mar, 15 | by Iain Brassington
It would appear that Lord Saatchi’s Medical Innovation Bill is toast.
The Lib Dems, who are reportedly the ones to have vetoed it, are nevertheless being mealy-mouthed about something they should be proclaiming from the rooftops: the Bill is/ was needless at best, and possibly dangerous. But, hey: there’s an election coming up, and cancer treatment is politically important; meanwhile, the party isn’t popular, and could probably have expected a set of “Lib Dems veto miracle cure” headlines had they made that move.
Which, when you read the Graun‘s article, isn’t a million miles away from Saatchi’s response:
“By killing the bill they have killed the hopes of thousands of cancer patients. It is as simple as that. Nick Clegg has handed down a death sentence to cancer patients.”
Which is, of course, untrue. But, hey: whatever else he may be, Saatchi’s a great ad-man, and there’s an election coming up…
27 Feb, 15 | by Iain Brassington
Guest Post by Akim McMath
In December of last year, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) released its proposed new recommendations on male circumcision. The verdict? Circumcision provides major benefits with minimal risks. These benefits accrue whether circumcision is performed in infancy or later on in life. Circumcision may even help to stem the HIV epidemic in the United States. Perhaps you should do something about that foreskin.
The resulting firestorm was swift, fierce, and predictable. Critics of infant circumcision blasted the CDC, accusing it of trampling the child’s right to bodily integrity. Defenders of circumcision fired back, extolling the prophylactic virtues of the procedure. Subtle questions about autonomy were lost in the maelstrom. Yet these questions lie at the heart of the conflict, as I suggest in a new article.
Let’s look more closely at the debate over circumcision and HIV. Defenders of circumcision tout studies showing that circumcision reduces female-to-male sexual transmission of HIV. Critics retort that there exists a more effective and less drastic means of achieving the same end – namely, condoms. Perhaps, concede the defenders, but many men don’t use condoms consistently and effectively – hence the enduring problem of STIs. That’s their choice! say the critics. So? say the defenders. And so on, ad infinitum.
The foregoing squabble is essentially a disagreement about autonomy. more…
By Brian D. Earp
The latest issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics is out, and in it, Professor Nigel Biggar—an Oxford theologian—argues that “religion” should have a place in secular medicine (click here for a link to the article).
Some people will feel a shiver go down their spines—and not only the non-religious. After all, different religions require different things, and sometimes they come to opposite conclusions. So whose religion, exactly, does Professor Biggar have in mind, and what kind of “place” is he trying to make a case for?
Guest Post by Eva Bolt
In the Netherlands, requests for euthanasia are not uncommon. A physician who grants a request for euthanasia in the Netherlands is not prosecuted if the criteria for due care (described in the Euthanasia Act) are met. An example of one of these criteria is the presence of unbearable suffering without prospect of improvement. Almost all physicians in the Netherlands can conceive of situations in which they would perform euthanasia. However, each request for euthanasia calls for careful deliberation. When confronted with a request, a physician needs to judge the situation from two perspectives. The first is the legal perspective; would this case meet the criteria for due care? To judge this, a physician can fall back on the description of the Euthanasia Act and receives help from a consulting physician. The second perspective is personal; how does the physician feel about performing euthanasia in this situation? Is it in line with his personal values?
Our study shows that cause of the patient’s suffering is one of the aspects that influence the physician’s decision on euthanasia. This is interesting, because the Dutch euthanasia act does not make a distinction between different diseases. In case of suffering with a clear physical cause like cancer, most physicians can conceive of performing euthanasia. However, there are also people who request for euthanasia without suffering from a severe physical cause. In these cases, there are not many physicians who would consider complying with this request. As a consequence, people suffering from a psychiatric disease and early stage dementia with a euthanasia wish will rarely find a physician who would grant their euthanasia request. The same is true for people who are tired of living but who do not suffer from a severe physical disease. Also, most physicians will not consider following advanced euthanasia directives asking for euthanasia in case of advanced dementia.
Concluding, while most Dutch physicians can conceive of granting requests for euthanasia from patients suffering from cancer or other severe physical diseases, this is not the case in patients suffering from psychiatric disease, dementia or being tired of living. This distinction is partly related to the criteria for due care. For instance, some physicians describe that it is impossible to determine the presence of unbearable suffering in a patient with advanced dementia. Other explanations for the distinction are not related to the criteria for due care. For instance, it is understandable that physicians do not agree with performing euthanasia in a patient with advanced dementia who does not fully understand what is happening, even if the patient has a clear advanced euthanasia directive.
Each physician needs to form his or her own standpoint on euthanasia, based on legal boundaries and personal values. We would advise people with a future wish for euthanasia to discuss this wish with their physician in time, and we would advise physicians to be clear about their standpoint on the matter. This can help to prevent disagreement and disappointment.
Read the full paper here.