By Dr. Johnny Sakr
Everyone thinks they know what a person is, right up until they try to define one. In their recent contribution to the Journal of Medical Ethics, Nancy Jecker and Caesar Atuire invite a richer and more humane account. Drawing on African philosophical traditions, they argue that personhood is not an isolated property of the individual but something shaped through community, relationship and shared life. Their relational model challenges the dominant Western idea that personhood rests mainly on cognitive capacity or self-sufficient autonomy.
Their view is compelling. It resonates with everyday moral experience, where people are recognised as persons because of who they are to others, not simply because of what capacities they possess at any moment. Yet, as I argue in my article, relational personhood does not fully address a key ambiguity that frequently troubles debates in bioethics. The word “person” slips between two different meanings: a moral being who deserves respect and a legal entity who holds rights and duties. Without distinguishing these layers, disagreements about embryos, dementia, artificial intelligence or end-of-life care easily become confused.
This blog post explains why a two-layer model of personhood can help. It preserves the moral richness that Jecker and Atuire highlight, while clarifying how moral recognition and legal recognition operate differently and why both matter.
The metaphysical layer: how persons matter morally
The first layer is the metaphysical or moral person. This refers to the enduring subject of concern whose identity continues through time, relation and narrative. On this view, a person is not defined only by rational abilities. A person is the same being who persists through childhood, adulthood, illness and fragility. Dementia does not create a new person. It affects capacities, not identity. Families know this intuitively, and so do caregivers.
Relational accounts help us see that identity is shaped within communities and relationships. We know who we are partly because others recognise us, care for us and ensure continuity when our own memory or agency is limited. This view strengthens rather than weakens moral protections for the very young, the very old and those with cognitive impairment. It reminds us that moral worth does not depend on performance.
The legal layer: how societies codify protections
The second layer is the legal person. Here, the question is not “what kind of being is this?” but “what rights, obligations and protections should the law recognise?” Legal personhood is a tool created by societies. It can be used to distribute responsibility, allocate liability and grant standing to entities that are not moral persons at all. Companies, ships and charities are “legal persons” because this helps the law function, not because they possess consciousness or dignity.
Once this is understood, many contentious debates become clearer. Discussions about embryos often slide between metaphysical claims about potential life and legal questions about rights or protection. End-of-life debates can confuse moral continuity with legal capacity. Proposals to grant artificial intelligence some form of legal status risk being mistaken for claims about moral standing. A two-layer model prevents this confusion. It allows us to say that something may deserve moral consideration without necessarily being a legal person, or that something may be a legal person without possessing any moral interiority.
Legal recognition is always shaped by political, cultural and practical considerations. Moral personhood is not.
Why the distinction matters for real cases
- Dementia
Moral personhood continues through continuity of embodiment and story. Legal capacity may diminish, but guardianship law reflects this. Duties shift but moral identity stays intact.
- Embryos and foetuses
Many communities attribute moral significance to early human life, but legal systems typically recognise only limited rights. This mismatch creates tension only if the metaphysical and legal layers are conflated. Keeping them distinct explains why moral concern can exceed legal entitlement without contradiction
- Artificial intelligence
Some policymakers have proposed limited legal personhood for AI systems to manage liability or regulatory oversight. If legal personhood is understood as an administrative tool rather than a moral claim, such proposals can be evaluated without assuming machines possess consciousness or deserve dignity.
Benefits of a two-layer model
Separating moral and legal personhood has four key advantages:
- Conceptual clarity: It becomes easier to identify when a debate is about moral status and when it is about legal rights.
- Normative coherence: Changes in legal capacity do not imply changes in moral dignity. The person with advanced dementia remains the same moral subject even though the law adjusts how decisions are made.
- Ethical inclusivity: A relational and continuous understanding of moral personhood protects those with limited autonomy, including infants, people with disabilities or the dying.
- Regulatory flexibility: Lawmakers can calibrate rights and obligations to different contexts, especially in emerging areas such as AI, without resorting to all-or-nothing definitions.
Moving forward
Jecker and Atuire’s relational framework rightly restores a sense of community and connection to debates about personhood. My argument is that their insight becomes even stronger when paired with a clear distinction between moral and legal recognition. Personhood is not a single status but a layered one. Keeping the layers conceptually separate ensures that moral reasoning remains rich while legal reasoning remains precise.
Together, relational personhood and a two-layer model offer a more inclusive and coherent foundation for global bioethics. They help us understand how to respect, protect and recognise those who share our moral world.
Paper title: Beyond Relationalism: Distinguishing Moral and Legal Personhood after Jecker and Atuire
Author: Johnny Sakr
Affiliation: Prince Sultan University
Social Media: LinkedIn
Conflicts of Interest: None to declare