By Daniela Cutas, Anna Smajdor, Kristien Hens, and Emma Moormann
According to the respondents in our study, the short answer is: not necessarily. We drafted a series of vignettes in which we explored the relationships between reproduction, genes, and parenthood. We wanted to understand the impact that the degree of genetic relatedness might have on how people construe the relation between a parent and their child. Our vignettes featured Marc, a man who cannot produce sperm, but who wants to have a child together with his partner Maria. We used three variations of the vignette. In one, a child (Suzanne) is conceived with sperm from a donor unrelated to Marc. In another, the donor is Marc’s younger brother. In a third, he is Marc’s identical twin brother. Thus the genetic relationship between Marc and the donor differed in each case. In the case of the donation from the identical twin brother, Suzanne is as genetically related to Marc as she would have been if she were conceived with his sperm. In such a case, we would not be able to say for sure, in purely genetic terms, that one brother had reproduced, while the other had not.
The degree to which participants were willing to say that Marc has reproduced varied in line with how much of a genetic relationship existed between Marc and the sperm donor. This might seem reasonable. If sperm from an unrelated donor is used, none of Marc’s genes are transmitted to Suzanne. But our findings showed that the correlation went in the opposite direction. When the donor was genetically related to Marc, respondents were somewhat less likely to think that Marc had reproduced and less likely to think that he was her parent. Surprisingly, they were also less likely to say that Suzanne is Marc’s child than that Marc is Suzanne’s parent in these cases. Thus, it seems that for our participants, one can be the parent of a person who is not one’s child. Accordingly, even in a situation where Suzanne is genetically identical to a child Marc might have produced with his own sperm, she is regarded as being less Marc’s child than if she had no genetic relationship to him whatsoever.
How could this be? One plausible interpretation is that respondents assume that when the donor is related to Marc, he will have a role in the child’s life – whereas if the donor is unrelated, he would not. The discrepancy may also be due to an asymmetry between the terms parent and child. One can parent and one can be a parent. To be someone’s ‘child’ does not function in the same way; it is not something one does, but something one is.
Our study targeted respondents who had English as their mother tongue. Different demographics might influence answers. We hope our exercise in experimental reproductive ethics can inspire further work with different populations to understand the ways in which people construe family relationships.
Affiliations:
Daniela Cutas: Clinical Sciences, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
Anna Smajdor: IFIKK, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
Kristien Hens: Centre for Ethics, Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp
Emma Moormann: Centre for Ethics, Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp
Competing interests: We declare no competing interest
Social media accounts of post author(s):
Daniela Cutas: X: @DCutas
Anna Smajdor: X: @acsmajdor
Kristien Hens: BlueSky: @kristien.bsky.social ; LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/kristien-hens-1612751/
Emma Moormann: https://www.linkedin.com/in/emma-moormann-36a5a3108