Julian Sheather on the trouble with Darwin
15 Oct, 09 | by BMJ Group
As this is a scientific journal, I imagine its readers will have more than a passing interest in Darwin. It is hardly surprising. Darwinism is a scientific hypothesis of such revelatory brilliance, of such simplicity and such reach, of such sheer explanatory power that it is difficult to remain unmoved by it. That it also, in a revolution of Copernican dimensions, knocked homo sapiens from the centre – or from the summit – of a divinely ordered universe means that it has also helped define our epoch, the epoch of scientific materialism. Darwin’s intention, of course, was that his theory would account for the origin of species, and this it quite spectacularly did. Few now doubt that speciation is driven by the survival advantages of naturally occurring variations in living organisms. Such has been the success of Darwinian theory, however, that there are few areas of human experience in which its proponents have not sought to wield its explanatory lance. Two of Darwin’s current cheerleaders, Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, seem almost to find within it a theory of everything – as if there is no dimension of our experience that cannot in the end be explained by it.
Being the married father of two young children I am sometimes given to reflecting on sexual morality. Reproductive behaviour, and therefore, by extension, reproductive ethics, is presumably of deep interest to Darwinians, it being the arena in which our genetic material goes about getting itself transmitted. To echo Richard Dawkin’s arresting phrase, it is presumably in bed that our genes are at their most selfish, even where our whispered words are all aflame with our beloved.
Among the many ticklish dilemmas of the reproductive life is the question of whether we should remain loyal to one or whether we should struggle to spread our genetic data more widely, whether we are being more true to the species by being faithful or faithless. (Consider the old Rabbinic joke: Moses comes down from Mount Sinai clutching the ten commandments. The good news, he says to the amassed Israelites, is that I got him down to ten. The bad news is that adultery is still in.)
Is this a dilemma that evolutionary theory can help us with? Presumably for a Darwinian – at least a Dawkinsian Darwinian, if that doesn’t sound too awkward – the question that must be asked of any activity is whether or not it is likely to lead to the maximal propagation of our genetic material, that being, after all, what we are programmed to do, irrespective of our own feelings on the matter. One of the difficulties here is that evolutionary theory can presumably come down on both sides of this dilemma. For slow-maturing primates such as ourselves, monogamy might just tie me into a family long enough to hold my offspring together until they reach sexual maturity. But promiscuity is presumably another reasonably effective way of spreading my genetic data around, passion no doubt making as many babies as careful family planning. It would seem then that evolutionary theory can give a plausible account of the two horns of the dilemma. It is far less clear that it can provide much help to anyone who might be wrestling with it. Something else is required, and that something looks very much like choice.
So here is a problem. If Darwinism can account for both sides of a dilemma, can it also account for the decision we make when confronted by it? According to contemporary Darwinians, human beings are driven by the same gene-replicating urgencies as animals. It is not clear to me, however, that animals actually recognise moral dilemmas. These seem to be reserved for human beings. Although there are times when we will respond instinctively in the face of a dilemma – oaths are straw to the fire in the blood – there are other occasions when we will stand back and think. And at that point we are doing something different, something identifiably human, and something that cannot, without distortion, be reduced to the fires in our blood: we are engaging in something like moral reflection.
It is tempting to go further: the facts of our condition – that we are embodied creatures capable of reflecting and evaluating – means that we are born, if not quite, pace Job, to trouble as the sparks fly upward, then at least to the capacity to struggle with ourselves. To the best of my knowledge only human beings have this ability internally to contend with conflicting goods. It does not follow, however, that because moral reflection emerges from the conditions of life that it can be reduced to them. Darwinism wonderfully explains the emergence of the human animal from earlier primates. But it is a crude tool with which to make sense of the complexities of our moral lives.
Julian Sheather is ethics manager, BMA. The views he expresses in his blog posts are entirely his own.
Your “Trouble with Darwin” blog is interesting, and brings to my mind a question about definitions- particularly the “morality” your speak of in your article and the word “ethics” in your job description. I have my own thoughts on these, but I would very much like to see your working definitions for these terms if you have time to reply. Thanks!
Jeff Thompson
Jeff Thompson
October 16th, 2009 at 6:01 pm
“To the best of my knowledge only human beings have this ability internally to contend with conflicting goods.”
It strikes me that one of the things that should keep science humble is that probably nobody will ever know what goes through the mind of a cow or a cat. Speculation about it is about as fruitless a way of spending time as speculation about the existence of goblins or supernatural deities.
“Darwinism wonderfully explains the emergence of the human animal from earlier primates. But it is a crude tool with which to make sense of the complexities of our moral lives.”
True, but then reliance on mythical gods, or fairies at the bottom of the garden. is perhaps an equally crude tool. Nobody said life would be simple, or fair.
David Colquhoun
October 17th, 2009 at 6:46 pm
It seems to me that some people are always plagued with immaterial realities that cannot be proven but only infered (at times in a feeble way, for many not at all). Darwinism precludes us from accepting moral realities, because if man is just a product of chance, then “moral standards” are just another way of saying “I don’t like this, I prefer that”. In this case, monogamy ou promiscuity have the same value, preferable only in terms of advantage or disadvantage, according to biological inclinations. Something may be considered “culturaly unacceptable” and thus be subjected to penalty of the local law, but that is just about all. In the end, if there isn’t an immaterial reference for our moral standards, then humans can do pretty much what they like and there will be nothing really wrong with that. Even belief or disbelief in supernatural deities would be just a matter of taste, only subject to opposition because it hurts other people’s opinion. If true, Naturalism is a defeater of all our human ambitions other than the simple gratification from mere biological stimulus. Thus according to Darwinians, there is no moral ground for condemning rape or any other sexual behavior of those only following their inclinations and seeking happiness, exactly what Darwinism entails. Most people, however, do not follow this premiss to its logical conclusion. Thank havens for Darwinian incoherence, otherwise the world would be a lot worse than it already is.
Vanderlei Ortigoza
October 19th, 2009 at 6:37 pm
Jeff - like many people I have a tendency lazily to use ethics and morality as near synonyms. If pushed, however, I would probably say that talk of ‘morals’ refers to normative systems designed to align human choices in relation to some idea of the ‘right’ or the ‘good’. Ethics I tend to see as the practical application of such ideas to the resolution, or at least the explication, of concrete dilemmas - hence my job title. I look at moral conflicts arising in medicine.
To David’s second point I would say that the choice is surely not between Darwinism or mythology. In attempting to account for the complexity - and the reality - of human moral experience we need neither fairy tales, not Darwinian ‘Just-so’ stories. We need an account that is adequate to the phenomena in all their complexity.
Julian Sheather
October 20th, 2009 at 9:21 am