{"id":1594,"date":"2012-03-02T10:05:52","date_gmt":"2012-03-02T09:05:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.bmj.com\/medical-ethics\/?p=1594"},"modified":"2012-03-02T20:10:16","modified_gmt":"2012-03-02T19:10:16","slug":"why-is-infanticide-worse-than-abortion","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.bmj.com\/medical-ethics\/2012\/03\/02\/why-is-infanticide-worse-than-abortion\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Is Infanticide Worse Than Abortion?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Guest Post by James Wilson<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The controversy over the <a href=\"http:\/\/jme.bmj.com\/content\/early\/2012\/02\/22\/medethics-2011-100411.full.pdf+html\">Giubilini and Minerva<\/a> article has highlighted an important disconnect between the way that academic bioethicists think about their role, and what ordinary people think should be the role of bioethics. \u00a0The style of this dispute \u2013 its acrimony and apparent incomprehension on both sides \u2013 are a sure sign that we as bioethicists need to think harder about what we are doing, and who we are doing it for.<\/p>\n<p>At the heart of tempest has been the authors\u2019 claim that abortion and infanticide are morally equivalent. Nearly everyone will agree that the authors are wrong about this, and that infanticide is and should always remain beyond the pale.<\/p>\n<p>The US <em>Born-Alive Infants Protection Act<\/em> 2002 stipulates that the category of person \u2013 and the full protection due to persons &#8211; must be extended to &#8220;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/1\/8\">every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development<\/a>&#8220;. \u00a0The deep question \u2013 from the perspective of academic ethics \u2013 is <em>why <\/em>every human being that is born alive should count as a person.<\/p>\n<p>Often in bioethics the most difficult task is to articulate<em> <\/em>just what it is that lies behind the sorts of intuitive moral certainties that we all have: that is, to make clear to ourselves, and to those who are inclined to hold opposing views, just what our confidence in our own intuitive moral judgments is based on. \u00a0This is often extremely difficult to do.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline\">Why Some Bioethicists Think that Birth does not Matter<\/span><\/p>\n<p>At the heart of <a href=\"http:\/\/jme.bmj.com\/content\/early\/2012\/02\/22\/medethics-2011-100411.full.pdf+html\">Giubilini and Minerva<\/a>\u2019s claim that infanticide is morally on a par with abortion is the premise <em>birth by itself does nothing to change the moral status of a developing human.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>According to them (and like minded philosophers such as John Harris, Peter Singer and Michael Tooley) what makes the difference between a person and something that isn\u2019t a person must be something to do with the capacities and abilities that a person has. \u00a0On such views, if we want to say that all human beings should count as persons then we need to provide some account of what <em>feature or features <\/em>it is that <em>all <\/em>human beings have that renders it <em>appropriate <\/em>to treat them as persons. \u00a0The feature of being born alive to a human mother does not \u2013 according to them \u2013 fit the bill.<\/p>\n<p>According to these philosophers, this definition of \u201cperson\u201d is both too narrow, and too broad. \u00a0It\u2019s too narrow, because it\u2019s clear that there could be intelligent alien species who had the ability to engage in moral thinking; but yet who clearly would not be born to a <em>human <\/em>mother. \u00a0They need not be born at all: perhaps the aliens from the planet Zog assemble themselves out of flatpacks from an interplanetary Ikea. \u00a0But so long as they are able to live and to value things as we do, why should we deny them the status of persons? \u00a0To do so looks like a human-centred chauvinism, no more than <a href=\"http:\/\/www.richardryder.co.uk\/speciesism.html\">speciesism<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>But the feature of being born alive to a human also looks <em>too broad<\/em>: what if the brain of the infant has been irreparably damaged, so that it will remain in its intellectual functioning at a level far below that of a chimpanzee and will never be able to love, to form plans or even to recognize itself in the mirror? \u00a0Why (and in what sense) does an infant like this count as an equal of a fully functional adult?<\/p>\n<p>John Harris has argued that we should strike down the thought that it is <em>being born <\/em>that makes the difference. \u00a0As he once put it, \u201c<a href=\"http:\/\/news.bbc.co.uk\/1\/hi\/health\/3429269.stm\">the geographical location of the developing human, whether it is inside the womb or not, is not the sort of thing that can make a moral difference<\/a>\u201d. \u00a0(Even here, he was careful to clarify \u2013 as he has <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.bmj.com\/medical-ethics\/2012\/02\/29\/john-harris-clarifies-his-position-on-infanticide\/\">on this blog<\/a>, that he was neither advocating infanticide, nor arguing for a change in the law.)<\/p>\n<p><span><span style=\"text-decoration: underline\">A Poor Reply: Banging the Table<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p>The cheapest and easiest response to this challenge is to merely bang the table and assert the sheer obviousness of the difference that birth makes. \u00a0As an example of this approach, Richard Nicholson once accused John Harris of indulging in \u201ca philosopher\u2019s mind game\u201d. \u00a0He continued, \u201cHe is wrong in saying there is no moral change that occurs in the process of birth.\u00a0 That is a change that is recognised in the law. \u00a0Most parents would recognise their views about their newborn baby are considerably different than their views about the foetus in the mother a day earlier.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>All this, one feels, may be true; but it is hardly intellectually satisfying. \u00a0Just because most parents would feel differently, it doesn\u2019t in itself follow that they are justified in changing their feelings this way. \u00a0It\u2019s weak to counter an argument that puts forward <em>reasons <\/em>by merely appealing to force of numbers &#8211; pointing out that most people judge the same way you do.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline\">Explaining the Significance of Birth<\/span><\/p>\n<p>If we want to defend the moral significance of birth, then we need to provide some positive account of why birth<em> <\/em>matters. \u00a0I want to outline very briefly three possible positive accounts.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px\"><strong>(1) The infant now counts as a person because he or she is now a separate living entity: he or she is viable and is not dependent on anyone else for existence.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px\"><strong>Some worries<\/strong>: it seems that this explanation misfires, because \u2018being a separate living entity\u2019 is both too broad, and too narrow, to serve as the feature that makes the difference between a person and a non-person. \u00a0It\u2019s too broad because dogs and cats are separate entities in their own right, but this does not make them persons. \u00a0But it\u2019s too narrow, because there can be persons who are not viable separate living entities: both of a pair of conjoined twins can count as separate persons, but in a severe case it might be quite impossible for both to be able to survive separation.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px\">\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px\"><strong>(2) The infant was already a person, previously it was lodged in the mother\u2019s body like a guest lodged in a house owned by someone else.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px\">On this view, there were conditions under which it would have been legitimate to expel the foetus <em>despite<\/em> the fact that it was a person (in circumstances such as those that Judith Jarvis Thomson considers in her <a href=\"http:\/\/spot.colorado.edu\/~heathwoo\/Phil160,Fall02\/thomson.htm\">famous defence of abortion<\/a>, for instance). The significance of birth is that all these reasons that the mother may have to abort the foetus are then defeated.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px\"><strong>Some Worries<\/strong>: This approach seems initially promising, but it may only push the problem further back: (a) we now need to give some non-arbitrary account of why the foetus was already a person, and how it became a person. (b) On this view it turns out that it isn\u2019t <em>birth <\/em>that is actually doing the work here in making an entity a person.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px\">\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px\"><strong>(3) Ethical vision beyond explicit arguments<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px\"><strong> <\/strong>Charles Taylor makes a useful distinction between two different modes of ethical argumentation, which he calls offering <em>basic reasons<\/em> and <em>articulating a vision of the good<\/em>. \u00a0As he says in <a href=\"http:\/\/books.google.co.uk\/books\/about\/Sources_of_the_self.html?id=qoG8asWZRGoC\">Sources of the Self<\/a>, \u201cIt is one thing to say that I ought to refrain from manipulating your emotions or threatening you because that is what respecting your rights as a human being requires. \u00a0It is quite another to set out just what makes human beings worthy of commanding our respect, and to describe the higher mode of life and feeling which is involved in recognising this.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Ethicists often place a very high degree of value on explicitness and arguments from consistency, invoking basic reasons in Taylor\u2019s sense. \u00a0A key part of Giubilini and Minerva\u2019s argument has the following structure, for instance:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px\">1. Persons are creatures with feature <em>F<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px\">2. The newborn does not have feature <em>F<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px\">3. Therefore the newborn is not a person.<\/p>\n<p>A large part of the acrimony of the dispute seems to arise from the fact that many feel that to adopt this kind of schema fundamentally misunderstands the foundations of ethical consciousness. \u00a0For them, what is foundational is the fragility of the life of the infant, and that once that has been appropriately noticed or articulated, one should be called upon to respond. \u00a0So on this view, the answer may not be to describe those valuable features of human beings in terms that are applicable to any potential being at all, but rather to draw attention to just what it is about human being that we mean when we talk about the intrinsic dignity and value of human life.<\/p>\n<p>This is something that is extremely difficult to do within the confines of analytic philosophy. \u00a0For such articulation of the phenomenology of our fundamental moral commitments, literature is far more powerful. \u00a0I\u2019ll conclude this post with a bit from Tolstoy\u2019s <em>Anna Karenin<\/em>, which perhaps provides some of this vision. \u00a0Levin is struck by wonder at the birth of his son:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Meanwhile, at the foot of the bed, in Lizaveta Petrovna\u2019s skilful hands flickered the life of a human being, like the small uncertain flame of a night-light &#8211; a human being who had not existed a moment ago but who, with the same rights and importance to itself as the rest of humanity, would live and create others in its own image&#8230; Whence, wherefore had it come, and who was it? He could not understand at all, nor accustom himself to the idea. It seemed to him too much, a superabundance, to which he was unable to get used for a long time.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><!--TrendMD v2.4.8--><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Guest Post by James Wilson The controversy over the Giubilini and Minerva article has highlighted an important disconnect between the way that academic bioethicists think about their role, and what ordinary people think should be the role of bioethics. \u00a0The style of this dispute \u2013 its acrimony and apparent incomprehension on both sides \u2013 are [&#8230;]<\/p>\n<p><a class=\"btn btn-secondary understrap-read-more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/blogs.bmj.com\/medical-ethics\/2012\/03\/02\/why-is-infanticide-worse-than-abortion\/\">Read More&#8230;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1240,443,563,394,328,2022,577,576],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1594","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-blogosphere","category-jme","category-language","category-methodology","category-philosophy","category-reproduction","category-resource","category-the-art-of-medicine"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.4 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Why Is Infanticide Worse Than Abortion? 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