You don't need to be signed in to read BMJ Blogs, but you can register here to receive updates about other BMJ products and services via our Group site.

Politics

China’s Terrible Transplant Secret

9 May, 16 | by BMJ

Guest Post by Wendy Rogers
Earlier this year, a Malaysian politician, Datuk Bung Moktar Radin, travelled to China to receive a kidney transplant.  The details are scanty. There is no mention of the source of the kidney that the Malaysian MP received.  Reports of foreigners travelling to China for transplants rarely make the media, yet they may be an important link in trying to untangle the secrets of China’s secretive transplant system.

Back in the early to mid-2000s, Chinese hospitals brazenly advertised on the internet for foreign customers, offering kidney, liver and heart transplants with astonishingly short waiting times of 2-4 weeks.  In contrast, patients in countries like Australia, the UK, and the US typically wait years, with many dying before an organ becomes available.  Despite initial denials, Chinese officials eventually admitted that virtually all their organs were sourced from executed prisoners.  Using executed prisoners as organ donors is uniformly considered unethical because of concerns that prisoners may be manipulated or coerced rather than being genuine volunteers.  Voluntary donation is at the heart of most transplant programs world-wide, although there are exceptions.

Violating this ethical principle by selling organs from executed prisoners to foreign (and Chinese) patients might seem enough to make China a pariah in the international transplant community.  But this is only one part of China’s terrible transplant secret. Reputable international investigators have gathered evidence that Chinese prisoners of conscience, mainly Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, house Christians and Tibetans, are murdered for their organs.  Falun Gong practitioners, who make up the bulk of the millions of Chinese citizens in “re-education through labour (laojiao)” camps, are subject to medical tests to examine the health of their transplantable organs.  This process creates a living organ bank where foreign patients and wealthy Chinese citizens can be matched to potential donors, who are then killed on demand so that their organs can be transplanted. This reverse matching process guarantees a suitable organ within a very short waiting period. more…

Recent Attempts to Restrict the Abortion Law in Poland: A Commentary

25 Apr, 16 | by BMJ

Guest post by Dr Atina Krajewska, University of Sheffield

A couple of weeks ago news hit the headlines about attempts to introduce a total ban on abortion in Poland.  The legislative proposal that caused outrange among women’s rights organisations has been drafted by a citizen’s initiative, “Stop Abortion”, and is the fourth attempt to restrict abortion access to have been given a parliamentary hearing in Poland in the last 5 years.  The proposal must be supported by 100 000 signatures before it can be voted in Parliament.  However, as this threshold has been easily met in the past, it is worth reflecting on its causes and possible legal and social consequences for Poland and Europe.

Current law

Poland is well known for its conservative approach towards reproductive rights.  The current Act on Family Planning, from 1993, extends the protection of the right to life to the prenatal phase of human life.  It allows doctors to perform lawful abortions in only three sets of circumstances: when a) the pregnancy constitutes a danger to the life or health of the mother; b) prenatal tests suggest a high risk of a serious and irreversible abnormality or a severe life-threatening illness of the foetus; c) there is a justified suspicion that the pregnancy is a result of a criminal act (rape or incest).  A lawful termination can take only place within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy.  The Act has been often criticised as one of the most restrictive in Europe.

Nevertheless, despite popular belief, it is not the current law that seems to lie at the root of the problem.  The reason for the limited access to abortion services for women is not the restrictive legislation, but its highly limiting and narrow interpretation and incorrect implementation.  Poland has recently lost three major cases before the European Court of Human Rights (Tysiac, R.R., and P & S) due to the lack of adequate procedures guaranteeing the full exercise of statutory rights and medical practice substantially limiting access to lawful abortions.  For the first time in the abortion context, the Court found that the actions of Polish authorities and medical professionals have met the threshold of inhumane and degrading treatment, set in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Poland is the best example of how social, historic and political circumstances led to the bifurcation of different forms of legality, i.e. to discrepancies between formal and informal rules, between law and other – ethical and social – norms.

The new proposal

The new bill “on the general protection of human life and preparation for family life” defines “prenatal life” as starting from the moment of conception, which is described as “the fusion of the female and male gametes”.  The same definition applies to the term “conceived child”, used in the Polish criminal code.

Crucially, the Bill proposes to delete all three conditions under which lawful abortion is currently permitted.  This, of course, constitutes a dramatic departure from the current legal framework, and converts the current legislation into an administrative tool setting general directions for (limited) sexual education and social care necessary for families affected by the new regulation.  At the same time, and more importantly, the new proposal sets out changes to the Polish criminal code, according to which ‘the causation of the death of a conceived child’ would carry a sentence between 3 months and 5 years of imprisonment.  The same sanction would apply if someone were to assist with, or incite, abortion.

There is only one exception. more…

No to Conscientious Objection Accommodation in Health Care

22 Apr, 16 | by BMJ

Guest post by Udo Schuklenk

Canada is currently in the midst of a national debate about the scope of assisted dying regulations and policies.  It’s a result of a 2015 Supreme Court ruling that declared parts of the country’s Criminal Code null and void that criminalises assisted dying.  As you would expect, there is a lot of forth and back happening between proponents of a permissive regime (à la Belgium/ Netherlands), and those who would like a restrictive regime.  Another issue is being debated as well as litigated in the courts, the seemingly intractable question of conscientious objection accommodation.

In preparation for incoming provincial policies on assisted dying, the provinces’ statutory medical bodies, such as for instance the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, have stipulated that while doctors are not obliged to provide directly assistance in dying to eligible patients, they must transfer patents on to a colleague who they know will provide that service.  A similar stance has been taken in the recommendations issued by an expert advisory group appointed by the country’s provinces and territories, who are ultimately responsible for health care.  The same holds true for a report issued by a special joint parliamentary committee of the country’s national parliament.  Unsurprisingly, religious doctors’ groups, but not only religious doctors’ groups, are all fired up about this and have taken, for instance, the Ontario College to court to stop this policy from being implemented.  Their argument is that conscientious objectors among its members must not be forced to provide even this level of assistance if their conscience dictates otherwise.

It is likely that the compromise reached will entail an obligation on health care professionals to transfer patients on to a willing health care professional.  That will not satisfy the objectors, because if you really hold the view that assisting a competent patient who meets the criteria stipulated by the Supreme Court is tantamount to murder, this compromise would simply translate into you passing on your patient to someone who you know would ‘murder’ that patient.  It is also not satisfactory from the patient’s perspective, because they could – depending on where they live – be forced to travel great distances in order to meet the obliging health care professional.  That could well prevent some patients from access to an assisted death.

The question arises why we should accommodate conscientiously objecting health care professionals in the first place.  It is somewhat taken as a given in much of the medical ethics literature that conscientious objectors are deserving of some kind of accommodation.  Arguments often focus on what makes a conscientious objection deserving of accommodation, and on what reasonable limits should be imposed on conscientious objectors, as opposed to the question of whether conscientious objectors deserve accommodation at all.

In our paper we develop a more radical argument for the view that health care professionals have no moral claim to conscientious objection accommodation in liberal democracies.  We put forward a number of arguments to support that conclusion.  For starters, it is impossible to evaluate the truth of the authoritative documents that motivate particular consciences.  The courts in many jurisdictions that have had to deal with conscience related cases have conceded that much.  It turns out that we also actually cannot test whether someone’s conscience claims are actually true, in the sense that that person actually has those convictions.  It might just be a convenient cop-out, and yet we readily accommodate objectors at great inconvenience to patients and significant cost to health care systems.

Why should we accommodate privately held convictions that objecting professionals would like to prioritise over their professional obligations to patients?   That demand seems unprofessional in its own right.  The promise to serve the public good and the individual patient first goes right out of the window, there and then.  These professionals joined their profession voluntarily and they knew that the scope of professional practice and their obligations to patients wouldn’t be defined by them personally, and also that changes to scope would invariably occur over time.  The content of conscientious objections is by necessity arbitrary and encompasses any number of practical refusals to provide services.  No health care system should permit its monopoly service providers that sort of freedom when it comes to the delivery of the very same services that they voluntarily contracted to deliver.  Permitting such conscience accommodations ultimately subverts the very reasons for why society has professions in the first place.

 

Udo Schuklenk tweets @schuklenk

Read the full paper here.

Why Brits? Why India?

3 Apr, 16 | by Iain Brassington

Julie Bindel had a piece in The Guardian the other day about India’s surrogate mothers.  It makes for pretty grim reading.  Even if the surrogates are paid, and are paid more than they might otherwise have earned, there’s still a range of problems that the piece makes clear.

For one thing, the background of the surrogates is an important factor.  Bindel writes that

[s]urrogates are paid about £4,500 to rent their wombs at this particular clinic, a huge amount in a country where, in 2012, average monthly earnings stood at $215.

It’s tempting, at first glance, to look at the opportunity to be a surrogate as a good thing in this context: these women are earning, by comparative standards, good money.  But, of course, you have to keep in mind that the standard is comparative.  If your choice is between doing something you wouldn’t otherwise do and penury, doing the thing you wouldn’t otherwise do looks like the better option.  But “better option” doesn’t imply “good option”.  So there’s more to be said there; more questions to be asked.  Choosing x over y because y is more awful doesn’t mean that x isn’t.  It might be a good thing; but it might not be.  There might be economic – structural – coercion.  Choosing to become a surrogate might be a symptom of there being no better alternative.

A related question is this: are the women really making a free choice in offering their reproductive labour even assuming that the terms are economically just?  Possibly not:

I have heard several stories of women being forced or coerced into surrogacy by husbands or even pimps, and ask Mehta if she is aware of this happening.  “Without the husbands’ [of the surrogates] consent we don’t do surrogacy.”

Note (a) the non-denial, and (b) the tacit acceptance that it’s the husband’s decision anyway.  That’s not good.

(In a wholly different context, I’ve recently been reading David Luban’s Lawyers and Justice, and – in a discussion about lawyers cross-examining complainants in rape cases, he makes this point:

([H]ere we have two people who are confronted by powerful institutions from which protection is needed.  The defendant is confronted by the state [that is: in any criminal trial, the defendant does need protection from the power of the state – IB], but the victim is confronted by the millennia-long cultural tradition of patriarchy, which makes the cliché that the victim is on trial true.  From the point of view of classical liberalism, according to which the significant enemy is the state, this cannot matter. But from the point of view of the progressive correction of classical liberalism, any powerful social institution is a threat, including diffuse yet tangible institutions such as patriarchy. (p 151)

(The sentiment would seem to apply here.  A view of human agency that sees liberty as being mainly or only about avoiding state interference is likely to miss all kinds of much more subtle, insidious pressures that are liberty-limiting.  Economic factors are such pressures.  The idea of the wife as property is another.)

I do wonder if readers of this blog might help out with answering one more question, though. more…

Nurses Cannot be Good Catholics

31 Mar, 16 | by BMJ

Guest Post by John Olusegun Adenitire

It seems that if you are a nurse you cannot be a good Catholic.  Or, better: if you want to work as a nurse then you might have to give up some of your religious beliefs.  A relatively recent decision of the UK Supreme Court, the highest court in the country, seems to suggest so.  In a legal decision that made it into the general press (see here), the Supreme Court decided that two Catholic midwives could not refuse to undertake administrative and supervisory tasks connected to the provision of abortions.

To be sure, no one asked the nurses to directly assist in the provision of abortions.  The Abortion Act 1967 says that “No person shall be under any duty … to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection.”  The Nurses argued that this provision of the Act should be understood widely.  Not only should they be allowed to refuse to directly assist in abortion services: they should also be entitled to refuse to undertake managerial and supervisory tasks if those were linked to abortion services.  The nurses’ employer was not impressed; neither was the Supreme Court which ruled that the possibility to conscientiously object only related to a ‘hands-on’ capacity in the provision of abortion services.

In a recent paper in the JME (available here) I have argued, albeit only indirectly, that this decision is only half-correct.  Nurses and other medical professionals have a human right to object to the provision of a wide range of services which they deem incompatible with their conscience.  I say that the decision of the Supreme Court is only half-correct because the Court explicitly avoided investigating the possibility of the nurses’ human right to conscientious objection.  Under the Human Rights Act, individuals have a right to freedom of conscience and religion.  That right may, in appropriate circumstances, entail the right for nurses to object to being involved in administrative and supervisory duties connected with abortion services.  If you ask me how the Supreme Court avoided having to consider the nurses’ human right to freedom of conscience and religion I couldn’t tell you.  I bet neither could any of the Law Dons at Oxford.

I realise that by appealing to human rights I am not necessarily making the nurses’ case any more deserving of sympathy that it already is(n’t). more…

Autism, Mental Illness, Euthanasia and the WaPo

5 Mar, 16 | by Iain Brassington

There was a piece in the Washington Post the other day with a striking headline: Where the Prescription for Autism can be Death.

Normally, if we’re saying that the prescription for x is y, we mean to say that y is being suggested as a treatment for x.  Painkillers are the prescription for a bad back, a steroid cream the prescription for eczema, and so on.  Even if you find that phrasing a bit clunky, “prescription” implies the recommendation of a medical expert.  On that basis, the implication here is that somewhere in the world, doctors are seeing patients, diagnosing autism, and saying, “I wonder if the best thing would be to kill you”.  That would be uiruite a Big Deal.

The place in question is Holland.  But a quick look at the article shows – surprise, surprise – nothing of what’s hinted at in the headline.  Here’s the opening few sentences, edited slightly for formatting:

In early childhood, the Dutch psychiatric patient known as 2014-77 suffered neglect and abuse.  When he was about 10, doctors diagnosed him with autism.  For approximately two decades thereafter, he was in and out of treatment and made repeated suicide attempts.  He suffered terribly, doctors later observed, from his inability to form relationships: “He responded to matters in a spontaneous and intense, sometimes even extreme, way. This led to problems.”

A few years ago, 2014-77 asked a psychiatrist to end his life.  In the Netherlands, doctors may perform euthanasia — not only for terminal physical illness but also upon the “voluntary and well-considered” request of those suffering “unbearably” from incurable mental conditions.
The doctor declined, citing his belief that the case was treatable, as well as his own moral qualms.  But he did transmit the request to colleagues, as Dutch norms require.  They treated 2014-77 for one more year, determined his case was, indeed, hopeless and, in due course, administered a fatal dose of drugs.  Thus did a man in his 30s whose only diagnosis was autism become one of 110 people to be euthanized for mental disorders in the Netherlands between 2011 and 2014.

So, then, it’s a story about a man, who happened to be autistic, and who asked a psychiatrist for euthanasia.  After a little to-ing and fro-ing, that request was granted.  There is no reason to believe that this was a case of death being prescribed for autism.  It’s just that he happened to be autistic and to want to die, and a prescription for assistance was provided.  Phrasing is important.

Dutch law on assisted dying is famously liberal; in considering the permissibility of euthanasia for psychiatric as well as somatic illnesses, it is in the minority of the minority of jurisdictions that consider the permissibility of any euthanasia.  I have addressed the question of psychological suffering in relation to euthanasia elsewhere, and shan’t rehearse the details here; suffice it to say, I don’t see any reason in particular to think that mental illness and physical illness should be treated all that differently in principle: more…

The Unbearable Asymmetry of Bullshit

16 Feb, 16 | by bearp

By Brian D. Earp (@briandavidearp)

* Note: this article was first published online at Quillette magazine. The official version is forthcoming in the HealthWatch Newsletter; see http://www.healthwatch-uk.org/.

Introduction

Science and medicine have done a lot for the world. Diseases have been eradicated, rockets have been sent to the moon, and convincing, causal explanations have been given for a whole range of formerly inscrutable phenomena. Notwithstanding recent concerns about sloppy research, small sample sizes, and challenges in replicating major findings—concerns I share and which I have written about at length — I still believe that the scientific method is the best available tool for getting at empirical truth. Or to put it a slightly different way (if I may paraphrase Winston Churchill’s famous remark about democracy): it is perhaps the worst tool, except for all the rest.

Scientists are people too

In other words, science is flawed. And scientists are people too. While it is true that most scientists — at least the ones I know and work with — are hell-bent on getting things right, they are not therefore immune from human foibles. If they want to keep their jobs, at least, they must contend with a perverse “publish or perish” incentive structure that tends to reward flashy findings and high-volume “productivity” over painstaking, reliable research. On top of that, they have reputations to defend, egos to protect, and grants to pursue. They get tired. They get overwhelmed. They don’t always check their references, or even read what they cite. They have cognitive and emotional limitations, not to mention biases, like everyone else.

At the same time, as the psychologist Gary Marcus has recently put it, “it is facile to dismiss science itself. The most careful scientists, and the best science journalists, realize that all science is provisional. There will always be things that we haven’t figured out yet, and even some that we get wrong.” But science is not just about conclusions, he argues, which are occasionally (or even frequently) incorrect. Instead, “It’s about a methodology for investigation, which includes, at its core, a relentless drive towards questioning that which came before.” You can both “love science,” he concludes, “and question it.”

I agree with Marcus. In fact, I agree with him so much that I would like to go a step further: if you love science, you had better question it, and question it well, so it can live up to its potential.

And it is with that in mind that I bring up the subject of bullshit.

more…

Stay Classy, BMJ.

14 Feb, 16 | by Iain Brassington

Lord only knows, it pains me to jump to George Osborne’s defence – more so by resurrecting a meme that was already past it when I was first invited to run this blog in 2008 – but on this one occasion, I’m going to have to do it.

Last week, the BMJ reported about a case in which a psychiatrist was struck off the medical register for having entered into a sexual relationship with a vulnerable client.  That’s dodgy enough in its own right; but he also asked her at the beginning of the affair to promise not to report him to the GMC.  That shifts the whole case from being only (!) deeply dodgy to downright despicable – in effect, he’s admitted in that that there is cause to report him for his behaviour, but then gone ahead with that behaviour anyway.  The vulnerability of the woman with whom he was having the affair adds extra piquancy to the whole sorry tale.

I don’t think that there can be any objection to this sort of thing being reported, though it doesn’t get reported often.  I don’t know how often the GMC hears this kind of case, or whether every hearing attracts coverage.  Maybe cases like this get reported whenever they happen, but that they don’t happen all that often.  Or maybe they’re not infrequent, but the GMC has the consistent bad luck only to hand down its verdicts on days when there are bigger news stories to eclipse them.

Or maybe – and I have a suspicion that this is so – it’s the kind of case that is much more likely to get reported when the perpetrator happens to be the brother of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  Call me a cynic, but that seems… tolerably likely.

Exhibit A on the evidence table: the opening sentence of the story in the BMJ.

Adam Osborne, the psychiatrist brother of the United Kingdom’s chancellor of the exchequer, George Osborne, has been struck off the UK medical register for “blatant disregard of the fundamental tenets of the medical profession.”

Quite what George has to do with the story, and why the link to him is worth drawing is beyond me.

Ha!  Just kidding.  It’s not beyond me at all.  It’s almost entirely to do with making the story enticing.  Adam’s behaviour is no better or worse by dint of his family connections; they do nothing except to add a detail to something that would otherwise be merely sordid.  And if you can offer a whiff of guilt-by-association by drawing a link between a creepy doctor and a prominent member of a government currently deeply unpopular among medics… well, so much the better, eh?

Now, the BMJ is not the only organisation to make this move: Adam Osborne has been in trouble before, and the BBC, for example, has never been reluctant to point out the family link.  Here’s the thing, though: I don’t think that the Beeb should be doing it either.  For sure, the BBC is at the very least a general-interest news provider, whereas the BMJ could, I think, be expected to concentrate on medicine and medics; yet even that partial mitigation of the BBC is so dismally weak that the only reason to articulate it is to provide a space to air doubts about whether it should have been articulated.

The BBC shouldn’t be doing it; no news organisation should be doing it; the BMJ shouldn’t be doing it.

The same principle applies to other people with embarrassing siblings, of course.  Yes, we know that climate-change “sceptic” Piers Corbyn is Jeremy’s brother.  Unless Jeremy’s policies on CO2 emissions are influenced by Piers, though, that’s neither here nor there; and in the event that Piers does something even dafter than predicting that another ice-age will begin in the middle of next week, there’d almost certainly be no justification for roping in his Jeremy.  The same rules apply.  But since that’s not a medical matter, I’m not going to moan about it here.

I just want to make it clear that I’m not holding a torch for George on this.  I may disagree with him about any number of things, but the conduct of his brother is one thing for which we shouldn’t throw brickbats at him.  Leave George alone.

Zika, Gandhi and the CDC

11 Feb, 16 | by BMJ

Guest Post by Agomoni Ganguli Mitra

Three pieces of news over the last weeks particularly troubled me.  In the first, and perhaps most radical of them all, Latin American governments began to urge women not to become pregnant over the next couple of years, as a public health measure to restrict the number of children born with microcephaly, potentially caused by the Zika virus currently plaguing the region.  The second came from the Indian Minister of Women and Child Development, Maneka Gandhi, one of the highest ranking officials in the current Indian government.  For years, India has struggled with non-medical sex-selective abortion (and female infanticide) in such significant numbers, that the sex-ratio for infants in certain regions has become heavily skewed.  Despite sex-determination being illegal since 1994, the practice has continued with the complicity of physicians and clinics, and in some cases without the consent of the pregnant women themselves.  At a conference in early February, Gandhi suggested that an alternative to the current, ineffective policy of criminalising those who provide ultrasounds and sex-selective abortions, would be to register and monitor every pregnant woman in the country to ensure that female foetuses are brought to term and female infants are not killed shortly after birth.  The last and most recent piece is perhaps the least shocking of them all, if only because we almost take it for granted that women’s health and lifestyles choices are seen to be closely related to their ability and inclination to produce babies.  The US government’s Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in a bulletin patronisingly subtitled Why Take the Chance?, has suggested that women should think carefully before mixing sex and alcohol intake, if they are trying to get pregnant, or (and this is what makes it particularly problematic) could unknowingly be pregnant.

On the face of it, these are three very different sets of circumstances, geographical, political and social contexts, and in applied ethics, context is crucial to rigorous analysis.  And yet I am struck by how, ironically, these policies and policy proposal fail to be contextualised within broader considerations of reproductive rights and justice by policy makers. more…

Should Junior Doctors Strike?

25 Jan, 16 | by Iain Brassington

Guest Post by Mark Toynbee, Adam Al-Diwani, Joe Clacey and Matthew Broome

[Editor’s note: Events in the real world have moved more quickly than David or I have; the facts of the junior doctors’ strike have moved on since the paper was published and this post submitted.  Still, the matters of principle remain. – IB]

A strike by junior doctors is planned for January 2016 following failure of the last-ditch ACAS (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service) mediated talks between the BMA and the Department of Health (via NHS Employers) – see media reports here, here, and here.  Industrial Action had previously been planned for December last year but was suspended at the last minute when both sides agreed to the now failed mediation.  The current regrettable position has resulted from over two years of formal negotiations between the BMA and NHS Employers regarding a new junior doctor contract.  The BMA went to its junior doctor members for a mandate for industrial action last autumn as the talks stalled and received an almost unprecedented mandate with 98% indicating they would be prepared to strike.

Subsequently, many well-known figures voiced their concerns about the ethical and practical implications of industrial action (here and here).  Strikes by doctors are not common, with only one example in the UK in the last generation, but far from unprecedented.  The overwhelming recent ballot result raises many interesting issues, foremost among them the ethical legitimacy of industrial action by doctors, specifically junior doctors.

The term ‘junior doctor’ is often misunderstood.  It applies to all doctors from graduation until completion of specialist training – over 50,000 individuals.  Their roles and responsibilities have evolved significantly over many years; their pay and hours have reduced whilst their debts, costs and responsibilities have increased.  The patient-doctor relationship has also changed with increased emphasis on patient involvement and the promotion of autonomy.

We have looked at arguments proposed during previous instances of doctor industrial action, often from this journal (see this, this, and this) and considered them in the current context.  Absolute ethical objections to doctor industrial action appear old-fashioned, especially when applied to junior doctors.  Concerns about harms caused by doctors withdrawing their labour also seem less sustainable in the light of recent evidence than perhaps would be expected.  Indeed, the ethical responsibilities of doctors may require them to take action if they believe patient care, or the well-being of their colleagues’, is being compromised.

So far there has been strong support for the junior doctors from the Consultant bodies of many Trusts, and the Royal Colleges.  The modern NHS asks more of its junior doctors than ever before, placing ever increasing responsibilities on their shoulders, with ever more challenging working conditions.  With industrial action by junior doctors now likely to go ahead, claims that it would be unethical appear to us to be increasingly hard to justify.

Read the paper here.

JME blog homepage

Journal of Medical Ethics

Analysis and discussion of developments in the medical ethics field. Visit site



Creative Comms logo

Latest from JME

Latest from JME

Blogs linking here

Blogs linking here