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Gratuitous music video

Would Aristotle Vape?

13 Nov, 14 | by Iain Brassington

As I surfaced the other day, there was a discussion on Today about the marketing of e-cigarattes between Deborah Arnott, chief executive of ASH, and Lorien Jollye of the New Nicotine Alliance (now there‘s an organisation that wears its heart on its sleeve!).  It’s available from about the 1:22 mark here.  Having re-listened, it appears to me that they’re talking past each other for a significant amount of time; but the points around which they’re at least orbiting has to do with the safety of e-cigarettes and the permissibility of advertising for them.  Arnott’s concern is not so much about whether using e-cigs – which I believe the well-informed call “vaping” – can be shown in adverts, but how.  Jollye’s claim is that all that matters is whether and that the devices reduce levels of smoking across the board.  The subtext here is that the tone of the advertising possibly doesn’t matter – but if it does matter, and making the devices more attractive gets smokers to make the switch, then so much the better.

Arnott’s response here is that if e-cigs can lure smokers, they can presumably lure non-smokers, too.  And it does seem initially plausible that if the point is to coax smokers rather than non-smokers, it could be done in a non-glamorous way. emphasising the grimness of smoking-related illness and the relative benefits of vaping.  Glamour seems to be an attempt to be appealing to non-smokers as well.

Does that matter, though? more…

Saatchi Bill – Update

28 Oct, 14 | by Iain Brassington

Damn. Damn, damn, damn.

It turns out that the version of the Medical Innovation Bill about which I wrote this morning isn’t the most recent: the most recent version is available here.  Naïvely, I’d assumed that the government would make sure the latest version was the easiest to find.  Silly me.

Here’s the updated version of §1(3): it says that the process of deciding whether to use an unorthodox treatment

must include—

(a) consultation with appropriately qualified colleagues, including any relevant multi-disciplinary team;

(b) notification in advance to the doctor’s responsible officer;

(c) consideration of any opinions or requests expressed by or on behalf of the patient;

(d) obtaining any consents required by law; and

(e) consideration of all matters that appear to the doctor to be reasonably necessary to be considered in order to reach a clinical judgment, including assessment and comparison of the actual or probable risks and consequences of different treatments.

So it is a bit better – it seems to take out the explicit “ask your mates” line.

However, it still doesn’t say how medics ought to weigh these criteria, or what counts as an appropriately qualified colleague.  So, on the face of it, our homeopath-oncologist could go to a “qualified” homeopath.  Or he could go to an oncologist, get told he’s a nutter, make a mental note of that, and decide that that’s quite enough consultation and that he’s still happy to try homeopathy anyway.

So it’s still a crappy piece of legislation.  And it still enjoys government support.  Which does, I suppose, give me an excuse to post this:

Many thanks to Sofia for the gentle correction about the law.

Testing, testing…

24 Mar, 14 | by Iain Brassington

So, yeah.

It’s been a bit quiet here, hasn’t it?

There’s been a range of reasons.  Mainly, it’s had to do with David and I both having to do (whisper it) real w*rk, and that’s got in the way.

And then WordPress went a bit odd, which made it impossible to post anything.  (Part of the reason for this post is to confirm that I can publish something.)

And something else, too, from my personal perspective: I’ve been blogging here since 2008, and it’s hard to stay grumpy for that long.  Even for me.  So think of recent quietness as a sabbatical.  I think my grumpiness is recharged now, though.  So there’ll be a guest post going up soon, and then – I hope – back to something like normal from me.

Hello, hello; it’s good to be back.  I’d post a link to a vid for that, too, except for the unfortunate associations with Gary Gli…  Wait: what?  The Glitter Band is still touring?  Good grief.  Well, if they can keep going, I have no excuse, do I?

Still can’t embed videos, though…

Italian Pop Music’s Role in Bioethical Debate

12 Feb, 13 | by Iain Brassington

Sadly, the list entitled “Great Moments in Italian Pop” is short; but the entry that must surely be at the top is probably very near the top of the list entitled “Great Moments in All Pop”.  It’s a 1972 song by Adriano Celentano.

Prisencolinensinainciusol.

It’s pure gibberish – a parody of what anglophone pop sounds like to people who don’t speak English.

I mention it here for a couple of reasons.  The first is that it’s great.  The second is that it’s a nice way of talking about people who appear to be going through the motions of thinking about ethical matters, but who just get it wrong, and are actually talking gibberish.

Via Dominic Wilkinson, this gem from BioEdge is a lovely example of bioethical prisencolinensinainciusol.  On the face of it, it’s a plea for consistency when it comes to policymaking.

[I]n the Australian state of Queensland […], the police union has argued that pregnant women who abuse alcohol should be forced to live in safe houses. “Those [unborn] children also deserve a right to full life and health and should not be disadvantaged simply because of the actions or inaction of their birth mother,” said Union president Ian Leavers.

Obviously this is a controversial issue, but I can’t understand how one can both defend access to legal abortion and lock up women who might harm their children.

The link provided is to The Australian, which is behind a paywall, so not something I can access.  However, News.com.au carries the story, too, reporting Union president Levers to have said that the state should be able to intervene in cases where children are at risk of foetal alcohol syndrome and drug addictions.

“Those children also deserve the right to a full life and health and should not be disadvantaged simply because of the actions or inaction of their birth mother.  The state must have the ability to intervene and protect the unborn child when its mother refuses, or is incapable or unwilling to do so.”

Mr Leavers said tougher laws would complement the criminal code, which provides for a charge of killing an unborn child or grievous bodily harm for any person who violently kills or harms an unborn child.

This is a bit odd, all told.  I mean: it might be easy enough to agree that pregnant women probably ought to reduce, or even eliminate, certain behaviours.  But the idea that that might be a matter for the law is very strange indeed.  What would the sanction be?  Is the idea that it’d be better for pregnant women to be in prison?  Fined?  And what about the plausible claim that alcohol or drug abuse is itself a health problem?  Or the distinct possibility that women who do drink or use drugs are much less likely to seek any medical advice at all during their pregnancy if they think that the state might punish them for their behaviour, thereby making a suboptimal situation even worse?  Legal intervention of the sort indicated would be both cack-handed and unjust.

But what about BioEdge‘s plea for consistency?  From what I can see, there’s a fairly obvious set of rejoinders.  First, the police union can say what it likes about what the law should be, but the role of the police is to enforce the law as it stands.  So not interfering with a woman’s legal right to abortion is not the same as defending it.  Likewise, mooting the idea that women might be sanctioned for risking the health of the foetus is not the same as locking women up.  BioEdge seems to have got the difference between voicing an idea, and enforcing a policy, utterly the wrong way around.  BioEdge‘s writer makes it sound like a moral argument is being made; but, really, it isn’t.  Second, that it’s odd to defend abortion but advocate sanctions against risky behaviour in pregnant women may be true – I mean, it’s not a crazy suggestion – but it doesn’t follow from that that one ought to change one’s mind about abortion (which is, I think, given BioEdge‘s commitments generally, what the implication is): all else being equal, and given a whole truckload of secondary arguments about the moral status of the foetus and the moral status of the mother, it’s at least prima facie more likely that it’s the risky behaviour claim that’s off.  Third, that the representative of a policing union has made a statement about what the law should be is in no way an indication that that statement should be taken seriously.

Come on, BioEdge.  Fair play to you: you look like you’re doing the job… but… Prisencolinensinainciusol.

Maybe there’ll be richer pickings from the other story behind the link.  In Tasmania,

the premier and deputy premier have released a long report on legalised euthanasia. They insist that there is no “sound evidence” of potential elder abuse. However, rates of child abuse are nearly 60% higher there than in other Australian states. Isn’t that a bit inconsistent? The kind of people who abuse children probably won’t mind abusing grannies.

Ummm… wait a sec: What?

Crime and the Less-Polluted City Solution

10 Jan, 13 | by Iain Brassington

People who listen to Today may have heard an article in the prime 8:10 slot on the 9th about the correlation between a drop in the use of leaded petrol, and a drop in violent crime rates.  (Mother Jones actually beat the BBC, having published a piece on the same research last week: I meant to post something then, but was buried by other stuff.)

The nub of the story is this: that violent crime has been falling in the past few years, and though this pattern seems to lag about 20 years behind a fall in the use of lead in petrol, the fit is pretty good: a decline in leaded petrol predicts a decline in violent crime by about two decades – which is just about the time that we might expect would elapse between the formation of the brain and the highest likelihood of violent behaviour in humans.  Neat.  The Mother Jones piece provides lots of links to the relevant research – links to this (from 1999), and this (from 2007), and this (from 2012).

If the lead hypothesis is sound, it seems to be ethically interesting in a couple of ways. For one thing, it opens the way to at least some antisocial behaviour to be seen as being symptomatic of a deeper public health problem.  That’s interesting enough as it is, but – admittedly – it might be little more than interesting, on the grounds that leaded petrol is pretty much a thing of the past anyway (Wikipedia says that, as of 2011, leaded petrol was widely available only in 7 countries).

But the other way in which it’s interesting has to do with arguments about so-called “moral enhancement”. more…

Is Julian Savulescu Channelling Bryan Ferry?

24 May, 12 | by Iain Brassington

Specifically, I have in mind Roxy Music’s “Love is the Drug“.  (Annoyingly, I can’t get the video to embed.*)  And I don’t just mean Julian – I mean him, and Anders Sandberg, with Brian Earp somewhere in there too.

The thought crosses my mind because I’ve been reading this essay in New Scientist, which apparently prefigures a paper that’s soon to come out in Philosophy and Technology.  It deals with the possibility of using neurochemistry to maintain loving relationships.  The evolution of human emotions has not, they claim, kept up with the other changes that humans have undergone and caused over the past few hundred thousand years:

[I]n many ways we are stuck with the psychology and drives of our hunter-gatherer ancestors. We are not made for the world and institutions we have created for ourselves, including that of life-long marriage.

The suggestion is that, while there is no “love gland” that we could tweak, we do know enough about neurochemistry to be able to make a difference to the likelihood that a relationship will last.  With care, administering and manipulating things like oxytocin, dopamine and testosterone might allow us to alter our emotional landscape – allegedly for the better.

Convinced?

One of the worries that is articulated has to do with authenticity. more…

Musing about Kant (2)

26 May, 11 | by Iain Brassington

It’s very easy, having encountered Kant for the first time, to think that his account of morality is much too cold and impersonal to be plausible – the sort of thing you might expect from a computer rather than a human.  And though this criticism is rather simplistic – I think that Kant does have a deep humanity to him: it’s just that he doesn’t think that that should inform morality – I wonder whether there’s something to it after all.  I wonder whether there’s a reading of Kant that could only make sense to intelligent computers, and – more importantly – computers in a network; and whether such an account of morality would come naturally to them.

The starting point for this little essai (and I make no claims that the thoughts expressed here are particularly well-developed: all I’m doing is taking the opportunity afforded by the blog to publicise some stuff that’s been knocking around my brain for a while) is fairly straightforward: Kant’s separation of the sensible and intelligible parts of human life.  As far as he’s concerned, morality has to do with the latter rather than the former (because sensibility implies determinism; morality implies freedom; freedom implies autonomy; autonomy implies the will; and the will is practical reason); he claims that

a rational being must regard himself qua intelligence as belonging not to the world of sense but to the world of understanding.  Therefore he has two standpoints from which he can regard himself and know laws of the use of his powers and hence of all his actions: first, insofar as he belongs to the world of sense subject to laws of nature (heteronomy); secondly, insofar as he belongs to the intelligible world subject to laws which, independent of nature, are not empirical but founded on reason.

As a rational being and hence belonging to the intelligible world, can man never think of the causality of his own will except under the idea of freedom.  […]  Now the idea of freedom is inseparably connected with the idea concept of autonomy, and this in turn with the universal principle of morality, which ideally is the ground of all actions of rational beings, just as natural law is the ground of all appearances. (4:452-3; emphasis mine)

and makes similar claims elsewhere.

Right: so the moral law is ideal rather than real; but, more importantly, Kant contrasts the “universal principle of morality” with the natural law that is the ground of all appearances – and so, implicitly, the universal principle of morality is to be distinguished from appearances.  I don’t think that any of this is particularly radical.  By which I mean, of course, that it is radical – but it’s standard undergrad philosophy stuff.

However, things get a bit weirder once you begin to prise that apart. more…

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