Comments on: R v Catt: The (Slightly Strange) Judge’s Remarks

By: Droid

Droid — Fri, 28 Sep 2012 23:17:00 +0000

Good point. The weighty restrictions of the abortion act could be in place for entirely spurious reasons.

The law stands as it is so the morals behind the law are not part of the law. In that sense the law does not consider any life morally weighty. But looking at the law we can however imperfectly trace the morals that lie behind it. Assuming hopefully that the weighty restrictions of the abortion act are not made for spurious reasons in my judgement it is difficult to argue that there is no moral weight being attributed to life after implantation. The far more weighty restrictions after 24 weeks only seem to make this argument more problematic. Rather it seems that the law is trying to display what it perceives as an increasing continuum of moral weight from implantation through 24 weeks to birth.

By: Iain Brassington

Iain Brassington — Fri, 28 Sep 2012 21:17:00 +0000

Not really. It could be that an act outlawing abortion gets onto the books for other reasons. For example: we could imagine that a government forbids abortion as a means of ensuring that there’ll be enough fit young men in the next generation to provide a standing army to fight the French. Tortured as that reasoning might be, it could still provide something like a reason to forbid abortion without having to think much at all of the foetus’ moral status.

By: Droid

Droid — Fri, 28 Sep 2012 09:06:00 +0000

In law, a life is morally weighty – although not as weighty as the life of the mother etc. – from the point of implantation. If it were not there could not be an abortion act.

By: Tom

Tom — Sun, 23 Sep 2012 00:30:00 +0000

I don’t see why anyone is making a fuss about this comment. It seems perfectly reasonable (and necessary) to point out that the provision in English/Welsh law to kill a foetus under 24 weeks doesn’t mitigate offences against the foetus after that date. Plus, it may well have been pushed as an argument by counsel for Ms Catt. So other than spurious attempts to discredit the judge (http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/sep/21/judge-jailed-abortion-woman-christian), what’s the problem?

By: nilsinela boray

nilsinela boray — Fri, 21 Sep 2012 19:17:00 +0000

I’m not sure how you think anyone could get an abortion at 39 weeks. This is a full term pregnancy. Puzzled about why the case was brought ? Well because you could murder the mother and the baby would still survive – this really isn’t anything to do with abortion laws

By: Nils Hoppe

Nils Hoppe — Tue, 18 Sep 2012 13:40:00 +0000

Cooke doesn’t articulate it very well but I would guess that he is deliberating the other offences to identify where on the spectrum of terribleness this particular offence lies – in order to appropriately justify the extent of the reduction on tariff he imposes in the end. After all, she doesn’t get the full life sentence.

By: Nils Hoppe

Nils Hoppe — Tue, 18 Sep 2012 13:36:00 +0000

It seems to be section 58 OAPA 1861: “Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her own miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or be not with child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life”. Nonetheless I agree that the sentencing remarks are a bit odd to say the least. Given that section 58 provides for the maximum penalty, why on earth go on about different offences.

By: Christian Munthe

Christian Munthe — Tue, 18 Sep 2012 11:44:00 +0000

I’m not well versed in UK law – or law, for that matter – as a professional in the field would be, but isn’t it strange that the crime she is convicted for is not specified clearly in relation to a specific statute? Para 12 mentions one possibility, but the judge seems to dismiss that idea. In para 17, other possible statutes considered in para 16 are declared inapplicable, but he then concludes that the defendant has committed an “offence more serious than manslaughter or any offence on the calendar other than murder”. Isn’t this simply self-contradictory, since the arguments given seem to establish that there is no crime for which the defendant has been charged that she can be guilty of, even in theory. Isn’t he effectively saying that he is inventing a completely new offence on the spot without support in any statute?. Doesn’t this violate rule of law?

By: Iain Brassington

Iain Brassington — Tue, 18 Sep 2012 09:48:00 +0000

It’s a weird, weird, weird case. The more I think about it, the more puzzled I get about why it was brought.

By: Frank Mason

Frank Mason — Mon, 17 Sep 2012 15:47:00 +0000

I’ve just read about the case, and despite my opposition to abortion, my sympathy is with the woman. Had she taken legal advice, she could no doubt have come up with a legally acceptable reason for an abortion on the NHS. The outcome for the unborn child would have been the same, and neither she nor the doctor performing the abortion would have committed an offense. Sometimes, even when we agree with the law. we have to recognise that the law can be an ass.